Boston’s defense vs. Golden State’s offense was the highly anticipated heavyweight fight basketball fans couldn’t wait to see heading into these NBA Finals. But in Game 1, the Celtics’ scoring onslaught stole the show.
Boston generated 129 points per 100 possessions, a mark topped only once in their playoff run (Game 2 against the Heat), and in just 11 games throughout the entire regular season. They shared the ball (an exceptional 76.7% of their field goals were assisted, trailing only what they posted in Game 7 against the Bucks), nearly half of all their shots were threes and over half of them went in—which only happened five times this season.
Now, the question for Steve Kerr, Draymond Green and Co. is should they execute the same strategy and hope Boston goes cold, or tweak their game plan and pay more attention to the outside (which is what the Celtics did after they lost Game 1 of their second-round series against the Bucks).
There’s plenty of noise in a game highlighted by such impressive shotmaking, especially in a fourth quarter that set a new Finals record for point differential (Boston outscored Golden State by 24 in the period). Al Horford, Derrick White and Marcus Smart threw flames from the outside. Some of that probably won’t carry from night to night; Boston’s 181.8 (lol) offensive rating in the final 12 minutes feels like an outlier, punctuating a night when things just didn’t go how the Warriors’ defense hoped they would. (Golden State had only two worse defensive outings all season: March 3 in Dallas and that epic beatdown against the Grizzlies in Round 2.)
But Boston’s success expands beyond the game’s final six minutes. It manufactured 119.1 points per 100 possessions in the first half, weathering a tidal wave of Steph Curry threes that could’ve otherwise buried them before the game even began. Jaylen Brown finished with the game’s highest usage rate and was unstoppable scoring and facilitating at the start of the fourth quarter, pummeling the rim and rising up for jump shots over defenders who were back on their heels.
“I feel like if you put the ball in my hands, more often than not I'm going to put ourselves in a good position to win,” Brown said. “I got going in the fourth quarter. I made some really great reads.”
The Celtics won by double digits despite Jayson Tatum shooting 3-for-17 from the floor, but Boston’s best player didn’t stop leveraging all his defensive attention, finishing with a career-high 13 assists and only two turnovers. “They do a great job of helping and things like that,” Tatum said after the game. “So, you know, obviously it's just as simple as if you draw two, find somebody that's open. That's what I was just trying to do.” From the start, Tatum was a willing passer who found open teammates early in the shot clock.
Horford’s first three was similar to the play above.
Both shots were made by Draymond Green’s man. This isn’t a coincidence. Green lived in the paint all game long, deterring drives before they could even happen. (Much more on this later.) Look how far off Horford he is in the play below.
This was on purpose. The Warriors threw out different looks and coverages all night long. All of them were designed to swarm Boston’s two best players and keep everyone else away from the basket. Boston only attempted eight shots in the restricted area and also made five of their 10 long twos. “Late in the game they went into box-and-one on JB. Early in the game they went to box-and-one on JT,” Ime Udoka said. “They went to zone some late.”
(Early in the second quarter, the “one” in the box-and-one Golden State deployed on Tatum was Jordan Poole, which … interesting!)
Beyond their belief that Boston’s role players won’t kill them from deep in three more games, the Warriors have some reasons to feel good about how they packed the paint. Coming in, it was a foregone conclusion that Tatum and Brown would hunt inferior defenders, as they’d done in the first three rounds.
Golden State was ready. Whenever Tatum or Brown found themselves isolated on Curry or Poole, it was all hands on deck as all four Warriors squeezed the floor. Often, they were in position to help on the ball without fully committing on a double team. Here’s Andrew Wiggins at the nail, forcing Tatum to reverse back toward Kevon Looney.
Better discipline shrinking and recovering will help. Poole and Curry also did their part. They moved their feet, gave strong contests and didn’t resemble a folding chair—especially whenever Boston sped itself up a bit too much.
The Celtics were smart about how they wanted to game the matchups, too. Instead of telegraphing their intentions and simply setting ball screens for Tatum or Brown—like the Mavericks mostly did with Luka Doncic—Boston disguised and delayed their aim. On a few occasions, Tatum set an initial ball screen and then immediately came off a flare (usually out of a pistol action). Here’s an example:
When Boston ran it again at the start of the third quarter, Tatum had Horford open for three but opted for a tough floater instead.
Here, the Celtics open their possession with a side pick-and-roll that the Warriors ice. Smart spins back middle and then executes a quick pass and chase that forces Curry into the action. Curry doesn’t want to switch and waves Wiggins back to recover, but it’s too late. Tatum won’t miss this every time.
The Celtics will seek out more and more mismatches as the series goes along. And, as well as he read the game, Tatum can be a little more patient attacking them. Here’s an example. With the floor spread and an opportunity to make Curry guard another ball screen, Tatum whips a pass to Horford in the opposite corner instead of waiting for Smart’s pick.
It’s not a bad decision by any means. Green had one foot in the paint when the ball was in the air. But there’s also value in making Curry work, maybe drawing a foul or igniting a drive-and-kick medley.
In general, these quick reads and scripted half-court sets help explain why Boston finished the regular season with the NBA’s best offense after the All-Star break. They move the ball, cut and accentuate each other. They also adjust from play to play. Take this second quarter pick-and-roll with Tatum and Rob Williams III. When the screen is set, Looney rushes up to switch as Wiggins drops below to take away the roll. Tatum responds by throwing it over to Brown, who has his way with Klay Thompson in isolation.
On the very next play, Tatum trotted up from the corner into another ball screen with Williams III. But this time, with a switch in mind, Rob slips the screen and gets fed for an easy bucket.
One last wrinkle to keep an eye on going forward: With 3:47 left in a two-possession game, Udoka called timeout and drew up a play that tweaked predictability. As would make sense, Smart ran up to set a ball screen for Tatum, dragging Curry into the fray. But instead of making contact, Smart ghosts the pick, freezing Wiggins for a split second as the Warriors realize they don’t have to switch. When Tatum drives right, Green is once again already in the paint to plug that hole, ignoring Horford (who initiated the sequence with a down screen for Smart).
It’s smart offense against prepared defense. Tatum spots the help and makes the easy pass to Horford, who drills a 17-foot jumper.
This shot wasn’t a three, but it encapsulates some of the broader philosophical adjustments Golden State can make going forward. Green doesn’t have to neglect Horford. He can take two steps toward the perimeter and watch Tatum go one-on-one against Wiggins. But, fully understanding they can’t take everything away at the same time, the rim has always been their priority. Under Kerr, since 2015, no defense has allowed a lower at-rim shot frequency than Golden State's. This year they ranked first in that category (at 27%). In these playoffs, they’re not only first, but permitting 10% fewer shots at the basket than what they did in the regular season.
“We'll be fine,” Green said after Game 1. “We'll figure out the ways we can stop them from getting those threes and take them away.”
That’s obviously much easier said than done against units that have four or five players who can drive a closeout and make a play. The Celtics are in the Finals having already seen and conquered similar defensive tactics, first by Milwaukee and then Miami. But more athleticism and muscle along the perimeter could relieve some of that back-line help. A healthy Gary Payton II will help (likely over Poole), and don’t be surprised if Jonathan Kuminga gets tapped in to square off against Brown and Tatum.
Those rotational choices will hurt Golden State’s spacing on the other end, against the best defense in the league. But if they can’t slow down Boston’s attack, spacing won’t matter.
