America and the West’s dependency on undersea internet cables could be a strategic vulnerability. It is the consequence of both geography and the rise of the international digital economy. Russia, by comparison, doesn’t rely on the cables as much, and it has a substantial fleet of spy submarines designed to operate on them.
Russia’s ability to meddle with undersea cables has raised concerns on many occasions in recent years. Let’s look at which Russian Navy submarines may be involved and how they operate, based on previous incidents which are only now being spoken about.
During the Cold War the focus was military communication cables and sonar arrays laid on the sea floor. But today the ‘seabed warfare’ arena has been expanded to include the internet cables which crisscross the oceans. Around 99% of our transoceanic data traffic flows through undersea cables, including financial transactions, email, social media and of course military communications.
Aaron Amick, a sonar expert who runs the Sub Brief channel on YouTube and Patreon has shared his firsthand experience of their modus operandi. Amick served aboard U.S. Navy submarines shadowing Russian subs operating over NATO cables off the Norwegian coast in the early 1990s. Note that this was after the end of the Cold War.
The first thing that the West may know of a Russian operation against the cables is the arrival of an Akula Class nuclear-powered attack submarine in the area. These can be very stealthy so they may not be detected. This is the over-watch patrol and will circle the target area to create a perimeter defense against snooping NATO submarines.
To reach the cable on the sea floor the Russians have unique nuclear-powered deep diving mini-submarines. These are known by the Russian term AGS, but in layperson’s terms they are a type of spy submarine. The most famous example is Losharik, which suffered a fatal accident on July 1, 2019. The AGS have skids to sit on the seabed and manipulator arms to work on the cables. They can lay taps (even on fiber optic cables), make inspections or cut the cables in hard to fix places.
But the AGS minisubs cannot get to the target area on their own. They are carried by a massive host submarine. Russia currently has two, the most modern being BS-64 Podmoskovye, which is an enlarged Delta-IV class ballistic missile submarine. She carries the minisub instead of the missiles. And Russia is starting trials of a newer and larger host submarine, the Belgorod.
The host submarine will patrol in a star-shaped pattern above the minisub, keeping frequent voice contact with it. The minisub might be down there for days or maybe a week at a time, before rising to dock under the belly of the host submarine.
Amick observed the operations in the early 1990s when the mini-sub was a type called the Paltus. It was carried to the target cable by a modified ‘Yankee class’ ballistic missile submarine which had its missile section replaced. The nuclear-powered attack submarine providing the over-watch patrol was most often a ‘Victor-III class’ boat. Two Paltus and one Victor-III remain in service but they have been superseded by newer types.
The new types may increase the length of time operations take place, and potentially they may improve the stealthiness of the operation, making it harder to detect. Additionally, back when Amick observed the operations the host submarine was unarmed. The latest BS-64 and future Belgorod both appear to be armed. This may eliminate the need for an attack submarine providing over-watch.
Protection of civilian as well as military cables is seen with growing importance in NATO. Traditionally, the raison d’etre of a navy is to maintain control of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). Until now this has meant shipping routes. But in a recent talk at The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), then Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe-Africa Admiral James Foggo extended this to include submarine cables. It is a logical evolution, bringing SLOC up to date.
Internet cables get snagged by ship anchors on a relatively regular basis, but this tends to happen in shallow waters where repairs are relatively fast. With deep-diving spy submarines Russia can operate at depths of at least 3,000 feet.
The U.S. now has the Cable Ship Security Program (CSSP), which allows the Navy to stipend commercial vessels to make emergency repairs. But this only covers two ships, which may not be enough in the event of a serious attack, or even accidental damage.
Naturally there is no hard evidence in the public domain that Russia is currently conducting operations against Western undersea cables. But it is undeniable that Russia continues to invest massively in the capability to do so.
