The UK’s decision to leave the EU was a seismic shock in Ireland. In the years following the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic had become less relevant. The peace process reduced the military architecture along the border, while EU membership enabled free movement of goods and people.
The Brexit referendum reintroduced the possibility of a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic. Attitudes hardened as competing political aspirations for Northern Ireland’s future returned to the forefront. Brexit added layers of complication on to existing polarisations between Unionists, concentrated on protecting Northern Ireland’s place in the UK, and Nationalists, advocating for Irish reunification.
But new polling from the Irish Times and the Arins project suggests these attitudes may now be changing. Across Ireland – north and south – there is a growing consensus that planning for a potential united Ireland is important, even among those who oppose it.
Perhaps most notably, even Unionists in Northern Ireland have reported a slight but meaningful move towards accepting possible future reunification.
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The latest polling shows that acceptance of potential Irish unity has risen from 21% in 2022 to 29% in 2025 among voters in Northern Ireland from a Protestant background. This was the period in which the fallout from Brexit was negotiated, resulting in the Northern Ireland Protocol.
The protocol is the mechanism governing post-Brexit trade between Ireland, the UK and Europe. Northern Ireland’s unique trade position under the protocol allows it to retain access to both Irish and EU markets, which have become increasingly important to economies on both sides of the border.
Data shows Northern Ireland has experienced economic benefits, including increased exports, in the years since the protocol was implemented. These economic benefits, along with the damaging prospect of a hard border on the island, may have made the idea of reunification more palatable – or at least, less objectionable.
Divided society
Though it has had a fragile peace since the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, Northern Ireland remains a divided society. Brexit reignited tensions over Northern Ireland’s future, leading to social and political unrest.
Research, including our own, shows that when people feel threatened, they often experience a “rally around the flag” effect. Brexit created real fears on both sides, strengthening both Unionist and Nationalist sentiments. Given this, the attitude change reflected in the new polling is all the more remarkable.
Social and political attitudes have always been at the heart of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Since the partition of Ireland in 1922, people have defined their national and political identity based on their attitudes to the border.
For Unionists in Northern Ireland, who are often culturally Protestant, the border affirms their British identity, retaining their connection to the UK and entitlement to claim Britishness.
For Nationalists, most of whom are culturally Catholic, the border was a divide imposed illegitimately by the British. The border undermined their claim to Irishness. The prolonged conflict in Northern Ireland, known as The Troubles, was driven as much by sentiment and symbolic identity concerns as by political realities.
Today, Unionists and Nationalists continue to hold opposing views on Northern Ireland’s future. However, evidence of attitude convergence suggests the extreme identity positions and polarisation associated with the Brexit result may have receded.
Now that the immediate threats surrounding Brexit have ebbed away, it would seem a more inclusive and constructive conversation about the island’s future may be possible.
Learning from Brexit’s mistakes
Clearly, acceptance that reunification might happen does not necessarily equate to support. However, it does indicate a growing recognition that constitutional change is possible and needs careful consideration.
For many, the mechanics of the Brexit referendum have been part of the problem. The 2016 referendum appeared to offer a simple choice: Leave or Remain. But there was little clarity on what Brexit would actually mean in practice.
The recent research from the Arins/Irish Times project suggests the attitudes towards potential Irish unity are partly driven by a desire to avoid the chaos of Brexit, and instead plan ahead.
In Northern Ireland, political debates are often reduced to zero-sum, win-lose arguments. This “us v them” narrative can obscure complexity and entrench division.
There is clearly a need for more inclusive and nuanced debates and forward planning. In practice, this means exploring the different possible models of a united Ireland – and understanding what each would mean – well before any referendum is held.
The Irish Republic has a well-developed political system to support referenda and a citizens’ assembly model that has been lauded as a solution to the democratic deficit that blights so many western nations. This model has proven effective in addressing complex and sensitive issues, notably in the 2018 referendum on abortion. Deliberation through the Citizens’ Assembly helped shape political decision-making and influenced the question posed in the ensuing referendum.
North and south, there is agreement that any potential move toward Irish unity must include considered and informed planning for future constitutional change.
Given its long and troubled past, planning will need to be careful and diligent to ensure Ireland remains at peace. But the recent polling suggests that, despite its many flaws, Brexit may actually have paved the way for a more constructive and less antagonistic conversation about Northern Ireland’s future.
Catriona Shelly’s PhD was funded by Research Ireland.
Orla Muldoon receives funding from the European Research Council (agreement 884927).
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
