The first thing to be said about this early draft of a potential cover decision for the Cop27 UN climate summit in Egypt, now entering its final days, is that it is a monster. Coming in at 20 pages, it seems to include text on everything from cutting greenhouse gas emissions (mitigation, in the UN jargon) to human rights, technology and food.
And yet the first line makes clear that even this hugely long effort – the Glasgow Cop26 cover decision was only seven pages long – is just the beginning. Rather than being a draft text in the conventional sense, ie, a document that can be edited into shape, this draft is even vaguer – a document seen as offering options on some of the “elements” that could be in an eventual text.
There are still items to be added on some of the most contentious issues at these talks, including how to stay within the limit of a 1.5C global temperature rise, how to help poor countries adapt to the effects of the climate crisis, and the most vexed issue of all – loss and damage.
For many issues, the text of the “presidency non-paper on cover decisions” contains just a marker. “Placeholder for relevant outcomes from ongoing negotiations,” is the phrase to look out for, and it appears at least 14 times in this text.
It is clear these negotiations are dragging if – with just two full official negotiating days to go – the early draft cover text is still so long and so much in flux. In the words of Carlos Fuller, the ambassador of Belize and the Alliance of Small Island States: “It’s only a long shopping list at the moment.”
Note: The cover decisions will also include the main outcomes negotiated under the relevant agenda items at this session, such as those on the Global Goal on Adaptation, Loss and Damage, Mitigation Work Programme, New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance, and others, as applicable.
Framing / transition to full implementation / implementation and ambition
Multilateralism
● Reaffirming our commitment to collective global response to climate change based on latest science and agreed principles, in line with article 2 of the Paris Agreement, recognizing the threat posed by climate change, acknowledging that such threat calls for the widest possible international cooperation in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication and through just transition pathways.
● Acknowledging the global challenges the international community is facing and the immense challenges due to overlapping crises of food, energy, cascading risks, geopolitical, financial, debt and economic challenges, compounded and coupled by more frequent and intense climate impacts, all having negative impacts in particular on developing countries,
● Noting the progress achieved in ICAO and IMO in emissions reduction in their respective sectors.
Food crises
● Acknowledging the global food crises that exacerbate the impacts of climate change, in particular in developing countries,
It’s significant that food is getting a mention, and so high up. Food and agriculture are clearly key to the climate crisis, but people trying to raise such issues have struggled to have their voices heard. This shows that Egypt is listening to the concerns of fellow Africans.
Energy crisis
● Also recognizing that the unprecedented global energy crisis underlines the urgency to rapidly transform energy systems to be more secure, reliable, and resilient, and the need to accelerate clean and just transitions to renewable energy during this critical decade of action, which requires immediate and massive deployment of all available clean and efficient energy technologies pathway which calls for scaling up solar and wind rapidly this decade
This Cop takes place against a background of soaring global fossil fuel prices, and an unprecedented bonanza for fossil fuel companies. There are 600-plus fossil fuel lobbyists at these talks.
● Noting that net zero by 2050 requires huge leaps in clean energy innovation and reaching net zero by 2050 requires further rapid deployment of available technologies;
● Also noting that providing electricity to around 785 million people that have no access and clean cooking solutions to 2.6 billion people that lack those options is an integral part of our pathway.
This is a coded reference to the tussles over African gas. Many African countries, including Egypt, want to exploit their gas reserves as prices soar. But campaigners and climate experts say a massive expansion in African gas could endanger hopes of staying within the 1.5C temperature limit. Proponents of African gas exploitation have shifted their focus to the need for clean cooking facilities for the hundreds of millions of people who currently lack them, and who suffer severely from indoor air pollution as a result. However, the question of whether countries will really use their gas reserves to bring gas or gas-fired electricity to the poorest for clean cooking instead of selling it to the highest bidder for export remains unanswered.
The net zero pathway relies on unprecedented international cooperation between governments, especially on innovation and investment. Technical and financial support is needed to ensure deployment and transfer of key technologies and infrastructure. Cheap electricity from renewable sources could provide 65% of the world’s total electricity supply by 2030. It could decarbonize 90% of the power sector by 2050, massively cutting carbon emissions and helping to mitigate the climate crisis.
● Being concerned with the impacts of the current energy crisis on the timely fulfillment of pledges and commitments related to energy transition and energy diversification, stressing the importance of avoiding backsliding on pledges related to action and support;
Avoiding backsliding is a key phrase here – the references to action and support mean developed countries cutting their greenhouse gas emissions and providing finance to poorer states.
● Stressing the importance of enhancing the share of renewable energy in the energy mix at all level as part of diversifying energy mixes and systems, and encourages the continued efforts to accelerate measures towards the phase down of unabated coal power and phase out and rationalize inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, in line with national circumstances and recognizing the need for support towards just transitions;
At Cop26 last year in Glasgow, the final agreement was delayed when China and India, among others, wanted to water down language in the text referring to the “phase out” of coal. They insisted it be changed to a “phase down”, which was disappointing to many – and brought the Cop26 president, Alok Sharma, to the brink of tears – but it was still the first time any Cop had agreed to formally phase down fossil fuels.
To have language on coal included in this decision would be another victory. There have been efforts to broaden the language to a phase down of all fossil fuels. On the one hand, reducing the use of all fossil fuels would be welcomed by many as it could lower emissions, but some have viewed this as a way of reducing the emphasis on coal, the dirtiest fossil fuel..
Finance challenges
● Reiterates articles 2, 4 and 9 of the Paris Agreement.
● Highlights that about $4 trillion a year needs to be invested in renewable energy until 2030 – including investments in technology and infrastructure – to allow us to reach net-zero emissions by 2050. Furthermore, a global transformation to a low-carbon economy is expected to require investments of at least USD 4-6 trillion a year. Delivering such funding will require a transformation of the financial system and its structures and processes, engaging governments, central banks, commercial banks, institutional investors and other financial actors.
Reform of the World Bank, which many countries perceive as having failed to help with the climate crisis, has been a major talking point. The bank is separate from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), so there is no mandate under these negotiations to require it to reform itself, but countries can send a strong signal that reform is needed, and suggest how that should happen.
Emissions framing
● Notes that since January 2020, 166 nations representing 91% of global GHG emissions have presented new and updated NDCs, highlighting with grave concern the significant gap between the aggregate effect of Parties’ mitigation pledges in terms of global annual emissions of greenhouse gases and the aggregate emission pathways consistent with the Paris Agreement temperature goal, in particular the pathways relevant to keeping the increase in global average temperature to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels within reach.
Getting countries to focus on limiting global temperature rises to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels was the main achievement of Cop26. So this year’s commitment to 1.5C is crucial, though will require serious emissions cuts by some countries, including China and India, who wanted to water down the wording in favour of the more ambivalent language in the 2015 Paris agreement. That document said: “Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change”.
Since 2015, science from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has shown that the upper limit of 2C is far too high to stave off the effects of climate breakdown, and that beyond 1.5C the impacts quickly become catastrophic and irreversible. So it is to be applauded that the focus on 1.5C is clear and prominent in this draft. But the language of the Paris agreement is still reflected in the clauses below, so countries who prefer the weaker commitment can emphasise them if they prefer.
● Notes the findings of the emission gap report that current unconditional and conditional NDCs are estimated to reduce global emissions in 2030 by 5 and 10 per cent respectively, and that to get on a least-cost pathway to limiting global warming to 2°C and 1.5°C, these percentages must reach 30 per cent and 45 per cent respectively by 2030.
NDCs are nationally determined contributions, the short-term national plans (usually pegged to 2030) to reduce or, in the case of the poorest countries, curb the growth of greenhouse gas emissions. NDCs were required under the Paris agreement, but had to be resubmitted only every five years, a provision known as the “ratchet”. At Cop26, countries agreed to hasten the ratchet, and submit new NDCs every year.
The NDCs submitted at Paris would have led to a temperature rise of more than 3C; those submitted at Glasgow would imply a rise of about 2.6C. However, few countries submitted revised NDCs this year in line with the ratchet – some pleading the cost of living crisis, and the Ukraine war – and current NDCs would see a rise of about 2.5C.
If countries’ long-term goals are taken into account, the picture looks slightly better – temperature rises would stop at about 1.7C. But those goals to reach net zero by 2050-60 are highly questionable as few countries have serious plans in place to meet them.
● Notes that total GHG emission levels resulting from implementation of the unconditional elements of the NDCs is projected to be 3.1% higher in 2030 than in 2019; whereas the total GHG emission level resulting from implementation of the NDCs including conditional elements is projected to be 3.6% lower in 2030 than in 2019. This indicates that if all NDCs (including all conditional elements) are fully implemented, there is a possibility of peaking of global emissions before 2030. However, in order to achieve that peaking, the conditional elements of the NDCs need to be implemented, which depends mostly on access to enhanced financial resources, technology transfer and technical cooperation, and capacity building support; availability of market-based mechanisms; and absorptive capacity of forests and other ecosystems.
The conditional elements of NDCs refer to aspects of developing countries’ national plans that are dependent on them receiving financial help from the rich. Some countries have agreed to cut their emissions by a certain amount, only if they receive the funding necessary to invest in renewable energy and other low-carbon technologies.
● Also recognizes that this requires accelerated action in this critical decade, on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge and equity, reflecting common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty;
● Welcomes submissions of long-term low GHG emission development strategies and NDCs.
Relevant linkages (biodiversity, SDGs)
● Underlies the urgent need to address, in a comprehensive and synergetic manner, the interlinked global crisis of climate change and biodiversity loss in the broader context of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, as well as the vital importance of protecting, conserving and restoring nature and ecosystem for effective and sustainable climate action, Nature-based solutions
The ties between the global crisis in biodiversity and climate breakdown were strongly emphasised at Cop26, but have been less in evidence here. Countries will meet in a few weeks for the biodiversity Cop, called Cop15, under the UN Convention on Biodiversity, and prospects for that meeting are also looking dim.
● Recalling UNEA resolution 5/5. Principles of the Convention and the Paris Agreement
● Recalls that Article 2 of the Paris Agreement stipulates that the Paris Agreement enhances the implementation of the Convention;
● Recalling Article 11 of the Convention.
● Also reaffirming Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, underlines that the implementation of the Paris Agreement will reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances;
The phrase “common but differentiated responsibility” originated in the 1992 UNFCCC, the parent treaty to the 2015 Paris agreement, and the founding treaty under which the conference of the parties (Cop) takes place.
Common but differentiated responsibility means that developing countries – at least, those which were classed as developing in 1992 – should not have to take on the same degree of action as developed countries in cutting emissions, and in providing finance to the poorest and most vulnerable to help them cut emissions and adapt to the impacts of the climate crisis.
Latest science, findings from IPCC reports
● Emphasizes the importance of the best available science for effective climate action and policy making;
● Welcomes the contributions of Working Groups II (IPCC, 2022a) and III (IPCC, 2022b) to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the 2022 adaptation gap and emissions gap reports of the United Nations Environment Programme, and recent global and regional reports of the World Meteorological Organization on the state of the climate;
Some countries have objected at these talks to having any reference to the IPCC, even though in the year since Cop26 it has released its starkest ever warnings on the climate crisis. Having this recognition in the text is essential; without it the arguments around the 1.5C limit cannot be understood.
● Expresses the urgency to showcase the irreversible impacts of climate change on the cryosphere, the need of research and investigation and the actions that must be carried out to the shortest term possible.
● Notes with concern the existing gaps in the global climate observing system and recognizes the need to enhance the coordination of activities by the systematic observation community and improve its ability to provide useful and actionable climate information for mitigation, adaptation and early warning systems, as well as information to enable understanding of adaptation limits and of attribution of extreme events.
● Notes that the impacts of climate change will be much lower at a temperature increase of 1.5 °C compared with 2°C.
Urgency of action to keep 1.5C in reach/ Ambition and implementation to close gaps
● Stresses the importance of exerting all efforts at all levels to achieve the Paris Agreement temperature goal of holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels,
The emphasis here on the Paris language on temperature goals, including 2C, in contrast to the stronger language on 1.5C above, will dismay some who wanted more forceful commitments to the lower goal.
● Expresses deep regret that developed countries who have the most capabilities financially and technologically to lead in reducing their emissions continue to fall short in doing so, and are taking inadequate and unambitious goals to achieve net zero emissions by 2050, while they continue to emit and disproportionately consume the global carbon budget. Developed countries should attain net-negative carbon emissions by 2030. Developing countries can enhance mitigation ambition based on the provision of support by developed countries to developing countries.
It seems unlikely this language will make it into the final decision, as it seems to be asking developed countries to reach net zero by 2030, instead of 2050 as they are planning. The IPCC calls for global emissions to be cut by 45% by 2030, compared with 2010 levels, and while most developed countries are planning to exceed this goal, they are not planning to reach net zero by 2030.
Just and equitable transitions
● Emphasizes that the transitions to low greenhouse gas emission development pathways should be just and inclusive;
● Affirms that sustainable and just solutions to the climate crisis must be founded on meaningful and effective social dialogue and participation of all stakeholders, and notes that the global transition to low emissions provides opportunities and challenges for sustainable economic development and poverty eradication;
● Emphasizes that just and equitable transition encompasses pathways which include energy, socio-economic, workforce and other dimensions, all of which must be based on nationally defined development priorities and include social protection dimensions to mitigate potential impacts associated with the transition, and highlights the important role of the instruments and measures related to social solidarity and social protection floors in mitigating the impacts resulting from the applied measures;
The just transition is a key issue. At core, it means helping those who have jobs in or dependent on fossil fuels to get well-paid jobs in clean low-carbon industries. At Cop26, South Africa pioneered the first just transition partnership, to help workers in coal. At Cop27, a similar partnership, worth $20bn, was announced for Indonesia.
● Also recognizes that this requires accelerated action in this critical decade, on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge and equity, reflecting common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances and in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty;
● Decides to establish a work program on just transition to discuss pathways to deliver on article 2.1 of the Paris Agreement in the context of article 2.2. Requests the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to recommend a draft decision on this matter for consideration and adoption by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fifth session, in a manner that builds on and compliments the relevant work streams under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, including the Mitigation work program.
● Decides to convene an annual high-level ministerial round table on just transition, as part of the just transition work program beginning at the fifth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement
Human rights and human approaches to climate action
● Acknowledges that climate change is a common concern for humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights including the right to highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, the right to adequate standard of living and the right to development, and that the actions by Parties should at all times ensure non-discrimination, gender equality, and promote empowerment of women and girls and intergenerational equity, and be sensitive and responsive to the disproportionate 5 adverse effects associated with climate change, including on indigenous people, youth, women and girls, refugees and internally displaced persons and persons with physical or mental disability/ies.
Human rights have been a key issue at these talks, with protesters drawing attention to the poor record of the hosts, Egypt. Civil society protest has been curtailed in Sharm el-Sheikh, but Egypt has repeatedly emphasised at public Cop meetings that it recognises issues such as gender and the needs of Indigenous peoples.
● Recalls United Nations General Assembly Resolution 76/75 which recognized the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment as a human right and that this right is related to other rights and existing international law and that its promotion requires the full implementation of the multilateral environmental agreements under the principles of international environmental law and the fulfillment of the relevant obligations and commitments of different stakeholders;
● Recognizes the important role of indigenous peoples, local communities, cities and civil society, including youth and children, in addressing and responding to climate change, and highlighting the urgent need for multilevel and cooperative action.
Support to facilitate implementation: finance, technology, capacity building
IPCC findings on support
● Recognizes the importance of the best available scientific information, inter alia, the findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in the provision and mobilization of financial support to developing countries in the context of just transition towards a low-emission and climate-resilient development;
● Emphasizes that accelerated financial support for developing countries from developed countries and other sources is a critical enabler to enhance mitigation action and address inequities in access to finance, including its costs, terms and conditions, and economic vulnerability to climate change for developing countries. Scaled-up public grants for mitigation and adaptation funding for vulnerable regions, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, would be cost-effective and have high social returns in terms of access to basic energy.
● Recognizes the role of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in providing scientific input to inform Parties in strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, while recognizing the need to analyze IPCC outcomes taking into account equity and common but differentiated responsibilities;
Need for scaling up finance
● Notes with concern the growing gap between the needs of developing country Parties, in particular due to the increasing impacts of climate change and increased indebtedness, and the support provided and mobilized to complement their efforts to implement their nationally determined contributions, highlighting that current estimates of such needs are in the scale of 5.6 trillion USD up to 2030, while the global annual flows to developing countries
Sums of trillions of dollars sound huge, but they should be seen in context. Nicholas Stern, the climate economist, published a paper last week, commissioned jointly by the UK and Egyptian governments, showing that about $2.4tn a year would be needed to enable developing countries, excluding China, to shift their economies on to a low-carbon footing.
That seems a lot, but Lord Stern points out that it is only about 5% more than the investment they would already plan to make and to receive, to carry on developing in a high-carbon way. The additional investment is well within the capabilities of the World Bank and other public finance institutions, with input from the private sector, to provide, according to Stern.
● Underlines the urgent need to accelerate and enhance climate action and provision of support for addressing climate change in the areas of mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage in order to make it possible to achieve the objective of the Convention and the goals of the Paris Agreement;
● Resolves to take the necessary steps for scaling up climate action while pursuing the achievement of a balance between adaptation and mitigation support, and taking into account country-driven strategies, and the priorities and needs of developing country Parties.
● Recognizes the urgent need for public and private finance to significantly scale up support for REDD+ results assessed and verified under Article 5.2 when meeting Nationally Determined Contributions or fulfilling net-zero claims;
● Notes that global climate finance flows are small relative to the overall needs of developing countries. Global climate finance in 2019–2020 was estimated to be USD 803 billion. This amount is 31–32 per cent of the annual investment needed for the global temperature rise to follow a well below 2 °C or a 1.5 °C pathway. This level of climate finance is also below what one would expect in the light of the investment opportunities identified and the cost of failure to meet climate stabilization targets. (SCF)
● Urges developed country Parties to provide enhanced support, including through financial resources, technology transfer and capacity-building, to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation, in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention, and encourages other Parties to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily;
NCQG
● Placeholder: Urges the ad hoc work programme on the new collective quantified goal to produce more efficient and operational results by 2023;
● Supports continued deliberations on an ambitious new collective quantified goal of climate finance from a floor of USD 100 billion per year to support developing countries, that helps in fulfilling the objective of the UNFCCC and implementation of the Paris Agreement.
In 2009, developed countries pledged to provide at least $100bn a year to help poorer countries cut emissions and adapt to the impacts of extreme weather by 2020. That target will not be met until next year. The failure to meet it is a key source of anger for developing countries and the “lack of trust” between the two spheres has bedevilled these talks.
100 bn goal, status, progress and urgency to meet it
● {Placeholder for relevant outcomes from the ongoing negotiations}
● Expresses grave concern that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 has not yet been met and urges developed country Parties to meet the goal and address the shortfall to $100 billion since 2020.
● Calls to achieve the 100 bn urgently
● Reiterates the Glasgow Pact agreement on doubling climate finance for adaptation.
Doubling adaptation finance
● Reiterates the call on developed country Parties1 to at least double the collective provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing country Parties from 2019 levels by 2025, in the context of achieving a balance between mitigation and adaptation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources; and Requests SCF to prepare a report on the adaptation finance including the doubling of adaptation finance by developed countries.
There were fears earlier this week that countries were trying to water down the Cop26 commitment to double the finance for developing countries from its current levels of about $20bn a year out of the $80bn plus that is provided in climate finance. This appears not to have occurred, and the commitment to doubling adaptation finance is safe.
● Calls on developed country Parties to take further steps to provide clarity and predictability in their adaptation finance pledges through to 2025; 1 Decision 1/CMA.3, para.18. 7
● Requests a credible and predictable plan on the delivery of the doubling, how the finance is being channeled, reviews adaptation finance pledges made at COP26 and whether funds were delivered, and calls for the adaptation finance pledges that were made to be fulfilled.
Transparency in delivering on finance commitments
● {Placeholder for relevant outcomes from the ongoing negotiations}
GEF/GCF/AF replenishment
● {Placeholder for relevant outcomes from the ongoing negotiations}
● Calls upon developed countries to show increased ambition in delivering support commensurate with the gravity of the climate change actions needed in developing countries, including through ensuring a substantial increase in the second replenishment of the GCF in line with the funds enhanced programing capacity
● Recognizes the centrality of the role of the adaptation fund in the climate finance architecture , and in this regard welcomes the new pledges made at COP27, and urges all contributors to fulfill their pledges at timely manner, and invites the contributors to ensure the sustainability of the resources of the fund.
● Highlights the role of the LDCF and SCCF in supporting developing countries actions to tackle clime change and in this regard welcomes the pledges made to the two funds and invites developed countries to further contribute to the two funds.
● Requests the GCF to consider providing developing countries with dedicated financial support under the readiness programme to transform their NDCs into investment plans.
Setting post-2025 goal
● {Placeholder for relevant outcomes from the ongoing negotiations}
Improving access to finance
● Emphasizes the ongoing challenges faced by many developing country Parties in accessing climate finance and encourages further efforts, including by the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, to simplify access to such finance;
Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement
● Place holder 2.1c
Call on MDBs and IFIs to align and scale up funding, and ensure simplified access
● Encourages all climate finance providers, in particular multilateral and bilateral development banks, to increase climate ambition using the breadth of their policy and financial instruments for greater results with a view to aligning with the goals of the Paris Agreement;
● [Notes][welcomes] the report on “Finance for Climate Action” which sets out the investments needed by Developing Countries to deliver on Paris goals, as well as the scale and different kinds of financial flows will be necessary to finance these critical investments, and calls upon all relevant stakeholders to consider the recommendations of the report for implementation.
● Calls on multi-lateral development banks to reform their practices and priorities, in order to reduce the cost of borrowing for climate projects in developing countries and to increase their investment into adaptation financing and urges MDBs to align their operations with the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and climate change emergency
● Calls upon MDBs and International Financial Institutions to scale-up funding, and mobilize climate finance from various sources, and encourages the shareholders of MDBs to define a new vision and commensurate operational model, channels and instruments that fit-for-purpose to adequately address the global climate emergency.
● Expresses concern that one-third of all developing countries and two-thirds of low-income countries are at high risk of debt distress.
● Urges the shareholders of the MDBs and IFIs to ensure that these institutions are fit for purpose to deploy the required support for climate action in developing countries.
Strong language here on the World Bank. David Malpass, the bank’s president, was here last week alongside some of his sternest critics, including the prime minister of Barbados, Mia Mottley, and the former US vice-president Al Gore. Pressure to reform the bank could be one of the most productive outcomes of these talks.
● Emphasizes that MDBs will need to provide significant share of financial resources, improve their leveraging potential of private finance, deploy full suit of instruments from grants to guarantees and non debt instruments, without exacerbating debt burdens, and address the conservative risk appetites and limited scale of capitalization towards increasing their deployment on climate finance three folds up to 2025.
● Underscores the urgent need for a fundamental transformation and modernization of the global financial architecture, including a systematic reform of the multilateral development banks to make them fit-for-purpose in supporting sustainable development and just and equitable transitions. The key is to address risk aversion in investing in developing countries, to prioritize grant support and to dramatically lower the cost and conditionality of borrowing money that places multilateral support out of reach of the majority of the world’s population, including in BASIC countries.
Debt
● Highlights that one-third of all developing countries and two-thirds of low-income countries are at high risk of debt distress. inlight of this tackling these debt difficulties will require a comprehensive approach with tailored solutions. This includes expanding access to low-cost official liquidity facilities; high concessional finance commensurate with AIDA terms; expanding the envelope of low-cost finance; including systematic debt-suspension clauses in loan contracts in the event of a natural disaster;
More than 50 countries are at risk of defaulting on their debt, with potentially disastrous consequences for their societies, the UN Development Programme warned last week. Yet the majority of climate finance provided to the poorest countries still comes in the form of loans, with high interest rates and repayment requirements. Providing more money via grants or concessionary finance, and lowering the cost of capital for the poorest,are key priorities for these countries.
● Being aware that the above-mentioned challenges are exacerbating the debt crisis of the developing country Parties and hindering their efforts to achieve sustainable development and poverty eradication, as well as the fulfillment of the key principles of “Inclusive Growth” and “Leaving no one and no place behind”.
Innovative financing options
● Further encourages the private sector to enhance its climate finance mobilization to increase the availability of resources for the implementation of climate action, particularly in developing country Parties and encourages them to commit to robust, comparable and science-based targets to align their investment portfolio with the goals of the Paris Agreement;
Technology
● Agrees on a two-year Sharm El-Sheikh Technology Implementation work plan to support the implementation of technology actions identified and prioritized in developing countries’ country Parties’ nationally determined contributions, national adaptation plans and technology action plans.
● Requests the SBI to elaborate the design of the work plan referred to in para x above, with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the CMA at its 6th session (November 2024).
● Considers the implementation gaps from climate technology activities and the results of the global stocktake relating to technology,
● Recognizes the challenges faced by developing countries to adopt low-emissions technologies, taking into account vulnerable conditions, including limited finance, technology development and transfer, and limited institutional capacity.
● Calls for cooperation for the development of cost-effective clean energy technologies and solutions to facilitate flows of renewable energy.
● Establishes the Sharm El-Sheikh Technology Implementation Work Program to take stock of the Poznan Strategic Program (PSP) and to support the implementation of the technology needs in developing countries.
● Resolves to further enhance international cooperation, remove barriers to technology transfer and cooperation, and ensure accessibility and affordability to climate technologies for developing countries.
Access to clean technology, or “technology transfer”, used to be a hot Cop topic more than a decade ago. China led developing countries in demanding access to intellectual property for renewable energy and other low-carbon technologies. Developed countries were adamant their private sector companies would not be required to give up any intellectual property rights.
The debate died down largely because the world moved on – China became one of the global leaders in renewable energy component manufacturing, and has in effect cornered the market in some key materials, such as rare earths, required for renewable energy systems. Some of this language on technology is here more as a matter of form than substance.
Capacity building
● Notes that capacity gaps and needs still exist in developing countries and calls upon developed country Parties to increase support for long term, country-driven capacity-building interventions to enhance the effectiveness, success and sustainability of capacity-building efforts;
● Welcomes the launch of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building toolkit to assess capacity-building gaps and needs to implement the Paris Agreement and invites Parties and relevant institutions to consider using the toolkit to support their capacity gaps and needs assessment efforts;
Mitigation
Relevant findings from IPCC and UNFCCC synthesis reports/ Acknowledging mitigation gap/ Call to strengthen ambition to close mitigation gap
● Welcomes the latest 2022 synthesis report on nationally determined contributions, and notes with serious concern the finding in that synthesis report that the total global greenhouse gas emission level in 2030, taking into account implementation of all latest nationally determined contributions and the principles of CBDR and different national circumstances; is estimated to be 0.3 per cent below the 2019 level. This is not in line with findings of 10 Working Group III to the AR6 that concluded that, in scenarios of limiting warming to 1.5 °C (with over 50 per cent likelihood by 2100) with no or limited overshoot, GHG emissions need to reduce by 43 (34–60) percent by 2030 relative to the 2019 level.
● Notes with appreciation the finding in the contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that there are mitigation options in all sectors with the potential to at least halve global greenhouse gas emissions relative to the 2019 level by 2030;
● Notes also that in accordance with the WGIII contribution to the IPCC’s AR6 demand-side measures have high emission reduction potential and encourages Parties to adopt appropriate demand-side measures;
● Emphasizes the urgent need for immediate, deep, rapid and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions by Parties across all sectors, in order to limit global warming to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels;
Again, it will cheer the UK and other countries supportive of the Glasgow pact to see the 1.5C focus here, without the Paris hedging of 2C. The emphasis on the IPCC is also good.
● Highlights the importance of ensuring and enabling just transition for developing countries.
● Reaffirms the critical nature of the present decade and the need to accelerate emissions reductions during this timeframe;
● Recalls paragraph 29 of the Glasgow Climate Pact, welcomes submissions of new and updated NDCs since Glasgow while regretting that some Parties have not yet aligned their NDCs with the Paris Agreement temperature goal, and urges those Parties whose NDCs are not yet aligned with the Paris Agreement temperature goal to revisit and strengthen the 2030 targets in their NDCs by the fifth session of the CMA and to report on progress at pre 2030 Ministerial RT/ SG summit/ GST;
● Requests the secretariat to prepare an updated synthesis to be captured in an annual LTS synthesis report on long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies referred to in Article 4, paragraph 19, of the Paris Agreement to be made available to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its fifth session;
The repetition of the just transition seems untidy, this could perhaps be better included in a single section on the just transition.
● Welcomes the announcement and further implementation of various mitigation-related initiatives since Glasgow and urges participants in those initiatives to report on progress in those initiatives in advance of CMA5 in 2023;
● Emphasizes the importance of further action to reduce by 2030 non-carbon dioxide GHG emissions, including methane, and invites Parties to prepare action plans to this end and regularly report on progress made through their BTRs and other appropriate vehicles
Submissions of enhanced/updated NDCs and long-term strategies
● Welcomes the new or updated nationally determined contributions communicated by Parties since the Conference of the Parties serving asthe meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at its third session (October-November 2021),
● Also welcomes the long-term low-emission development strategies communicated by Parties;
● Repeats request for all Parties to revisit and strengthen 2030 NDCs to align with 1.5°C; and Calls on Parties to update LTS regularly in line with the latest available science in line with NDCs
More repetition, on the NDCs. This time it is emphasising the ratchet agreed in Glasgow by requesting, though not requiring, countries to come up with better NDCs sooner. This is strong text and some will seek to water it down.
Link between mitigation and means of implementation
● Acknowledges that enhancing support for developing country Parties will allow for higher ambition in their mitigation actions and urges developed country Parties to increase such support;
Mitigation Work Programme & Mitigation Roundtable
● {Placeholder}
Adaptation
Relevant findings from IPCC and UNFCCC synthesis reports/ Relevance/urgency of adaptation
● Welcomes the contribution of Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sixth Assessment Report and recognizes the importance of fostering a climate resilient development, integrating adaptation and mitigation action with equity and system transitions putting in the center nature and people;
● Notes with serious concern the findings from the contribution of Working Group II to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, according to which, despite progress in adaptation planning and implementation, adaptation gaps exist between current levels of adaptation and levels needed to respond to impacts and reduce climate risks;
● Also notes the finding that while there are feasible and effective adaptation options which can reduce risks to people and nature, current adaptation practice is small scale, fragmented, and incremental;
● Urges Parties to go beyond incremental action and take a transformational approach to enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change by integrating adaptation into policy, programs, and budgets to accelerate climate resilient development;
● Invites IPCC to produce a special report on GGA.
● Recognizes the importance of the global goal on adaptation for the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement and recalls decision 7/CMA.3 to establish and launch the Glasgow – Sharm el Sheikh work program on the global goal on adaptation.
The doubling of climate finance for adaptation is key for the poorest developing countries. At present, most of the existing climate finance flows to middle-income countries, much of it for projects that could have been profitable, and obtained private sector investment, even without the aid. Adaptation projects, by contrast, are almost impossible to fund from private sector sources, but they are a literal lifeline for beleaguered communities.
Projects such as regrowing mangrove swamps, restoring forests and wetlands, constructing more robust buildings, and installing early warning systems, can all save lives when extreme weather strikes. Their benefits are huge, but diffuse, so private sector companies will not stump up cash in the way they would for a wind farm or solar panels. That means if we want more of the available climate finance to go to where it is most needed, a much bigger proportion needs to be earmarked for adaptation.
● Welcomes the progress made in year one of the two-year Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation, as outlined in the progress report of the subsidiary bodies.
● Looks forward to the conclusion of the Glasgow–Sharm el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation at COP28 and notes the robust program of work for 2023 laid out in decision XX/CMA.4.
● Notes the increasing number of countries with adaptation plans and policies, with 38 national adaptation plans submitted by developing countries and over eighty percent of Parties with a least one national adaptation planning instrument and urges Parties who have not yet done so to continue to engage in adaptation planning and action, as called for by Article 7.9 of the Paris Agreement, including formulating and implementing national 12 adaptation plans; assessing climate change impacts and vulnerability; monitoring and evaluating and learning from adaptation plans, policies, programmes and actions; and building the resilience of socioeconomic and ecological systems.
● Urges Parties to go beyond incremental action and take a transformational approach to enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change by integrating adaptation into policy, programs, and budgets to accelerate climate resilient development.
● Recalls that the current needs for adaptation are significant and that greater adaptation needs involve scaled-up resources and doubling financial resources for adaptation, and the urgency to fulfill the mandate of having a clear Global Goal on Adaptation to guide the provision of finance and means of implementation from developed to developing countries to reduce the risk of climate change impacts.
● Notes that the GGA is a framework established, which will have clearly defined dimensions/focus areas, sectors, cross-cutting approaches, indicators/metrics/targets as appropriate, and sources of information/input that will enable the full and sustained implementation of the Paris Agreement.
● Invites Parties to move towards achieving the GGA with the view to enhancing adaptation action and support.
● Invites IPCC to further contribute with a special report and a methodological report to be included in the IPCC seventh assessment cycle work programme to reflect on the gaps and needs for the GGA.
● Reiterates that developed countries should at least double their provision of adaptation finance by 2025, with transparency including by providing timetables and roadmaps.
This is strong language that reflects the settlement reached in Glasgow for a doubling of climate finance for adaptation.
● Highlights the importance of funding for preparing and implementing the NAPs.
● Reaffirms that adaptation is a global challenge with varying local, national, regional and transboundary impacts and risks that require coordinated global response under the Convention and its Paris Agreement, guided by the agreed principles, and taking into account the priorities and needs of developing country Parties;
● Notes with serious concern the gravity of the most recent available science findings including Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Sixth Assessment Report, and UNEP Adaptation Gap Report on the complex and compound impacts and risks resulting from climate hazards occurring concurrently, and cascading across sectors and regions, while confirming with confidence a widened adaptation implementation gap as commensurate with the adaptation needs and risks, affecting the most vulnerable hotspots.
● Considers that any further delay in concerted global adaptation action will miss the brief, rapidly closing window to secure a livable future.
Early warning systems
● Notes with serious concern, that one third of the world, including sixty percent of Africa, does not have access to early warning and climate information services, and calls for the rapid development, innovation, and delivery of climate information to better adapt to and manage the impacts of climate change [in line with the UN Secretary General’s call for Early Warning for All in the next five years].
● Welcomes and reiterates the UN Secretary-General call made on World Meteorological Day on 23 March 20222 to protect everyone on earth through universal coverage of early warning systems against extreme weather and climate change within the next five years
Early warning systems about impending extreme weather, such as floods and storms, are one of the key priorities of the UN secretary general, António Guterres.
● Requests the development partners, international financial institutions and operating entities of the financial mechanism to provide support for implementation of this initiative
Role of NAPs and AdComs
● {Placeholder for relevant outcomes from the ongoing negotiations}
● Acknowledges the crucial role of NAPs and urge the emphasis on NAPS in adaptation finance
● Acknowledges the vital role of the global goal on adaptation in fulfilling the 2.1b) in the Paris Agreement and pursuing enhanced action and support, including financial support for developing countries.
● Reflects importance of GLASS and the communication of input to GST in decision xx
● Underlines the need for ecosystem based approach for adaptation
● Highlights importance to avoid maladaptation
● Dedicates support for the implementation of the NDCs, NAPs and LT-LEDS.
● Recalls paragraph 29 of decision 1/CMA.3 of the Glasgow Climate Pact, and welcomes Parties’ efforts so far to revisit and strengthen NDCs to align with the Paris temperature goal.
Adaptation to be effective and locally-led
● Emphasizes that paths to adaptation need to be inclusive and locally determined and that support needs to be delivered in line with country-driven priorities;
● Highlights the role and need for locally led adaption and recognizes that the indigenous peoples and traditional knowledge are crucial.
Adaptation Finance
● Notes with serious concern that the current levels of international adaptation finance flows, specially to address developing country Parties needs and priorities is insufficient and inadequate to respond to climate change impacts, risks and vulnerabilities;
● Calls for a strong political will to transform pledges into implementation actions in accordance with relevant decisions on acceleration of adaptation finance, in particular the doubling of 2019 adaptation finance flows by 2025;
Even though these relatively uncontroversial elements are diffuse, this text needs to be trimmed and tightened.
Additional Technical work
● Recognizes the challenges associated with reviewing overall progress in achieving the global goal on adaptation given the challenges involved in assessing progress on adaptation at the local, national, regional and international level;
● Invites the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to consider a special report on the global goal on adaptation as part of its Seventh Assessment Cycle Report, and to present its findings to the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-eighth session (November 2023), including those relevant to achieving the global goal on adaptation and assessing progress towards achieving it in light of the temperature goal, contributing to the first and subsequent global stocktake.
Loss and damage
Relevance/urgency to address loss and damage (L&D)
● Recognizes that implementation of the Paris Agreement must include action related to averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse impacts of climate change and that the most vulnerable countries will be significantly affected by loss and damage;
And here, at last, we have it – the most controversial issue on the table. The text begins with the least contentious aspects, by noting that loss and damage is occurring, and details the impacts of it. It is quite a way into this section before we get to the “alarm” at the “insufficiency of financial resources” provided for loss and damage, which are the key issues.
● Also recognizes the growing urgency to address loss and damage as it will be increasing with each fraction of a degree in global temperature rise;
● Notes with great concern, as documented by IPCC 6th AR WG II report, the growing gravity, scope and frequency of loss and damage in all regions, and that loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change take the form of extreme weather events as well as slow onset events, and result in devastating economic and non-economic losses including through its impact on cultural heritage, human mobility and forced displacement and the lives and livelihoods of local communities, and underlines in this regard that an adequate and effective response to loss and damage is of great importance to the continue credibility and relevance of the UNFCCC process;
● Expresses deep concern towards the significant financial costs associated with loss and damage for developing countries, resulting in increasing the burden of indebtness and impairing the realization of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, and recalling the principles of equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities, while underlining that the IPCC WG II report and most recent best available science concluded that the gravity, scope and frequency of losses and damages will continue to increase with every additional fraction of temperature increase. In this regard, expresses their alarm by the insufficiency of financial resources provided or available to avert, minimize and address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, particularly addressing loss and damage.
“There is “deep concern” and even “alarm” about loss and damage – these are strong words, and deserve to make it into the final text.
But note what is not here. The words “reparation”, “liability” and “compensation” have been used by some climate campaigners, and a few countries, to describe loss and damage at these talks. These words, which carry specific legal meanings, are found nowhere in this text.
Likewise, under the Paris Cop decision text, the terms liability and compensation are excluded.
Loss and damage refers to the ravages of extreme weather too severe for countries to adaptor protect themselves against, and includes the social and economic impacts, as well as damage to physical infrastructure. It also refers to the financial assistance developed countries must provide to afflicted countries for the loss and damage they suffer, but does not equate this to compensation.
● Reiterates the urgency of scaling up action and support, as appropriate, including finance, technology transfer and capacity-building, for implementing approaches for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change in developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to these effects, and that scaling up action and support requires significant new and additional resources to address existing financial gaps particularly in relation to addressing loss and damage;
● Welcomes the Parties agreement for the first time to include a sub-agenda item titled “Matters related to funding arrangements responding to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change including a focus on addressing loss and damage” under agenda item titled “matters related to finance” under COP and CMA, as a reflection of the wide global consensus around the grave situation in relation to loss and damage and the need for effective funding arrangements related to responding to loss and damage in particular addressing loss and damage.
● Acknowledges the relevant work undertaken outside the UNFCCC process in relation to activities of averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change such as the G7’s Global Climate Risk Shield, Insuresilience, and the WMO and UNSG’s Initiative on Early Warning Systems for All, and considering them as useful contributions that can complement and mutually reinforce the progress aspired under the UNFCCC Framework, through a broader and diverse financial ecosystem which includes, but not limited to, innovative and hybrid sources of finance.
Some developing countries support a “mosaic” approach to finance for loss and damage, which would draw together finance from a variety of sources, including the World Bank and other public finance institutions, and initiatives such as the Global Shield, a German idea for an insurance programme that would pay out quickly to poor countries when disaster strikes.
However, other developing countries want to see a single new financial facility for loss and damage, which would take the place of any existing finance and could draw money from mechanisms, such as a global carbon tax.
The debate over what form such financing should take is unlikely to be resolved at these talks. That will be a bitter disappointment to developing countries, who accuse rich nations, such as the US, of dragging their feet. Rich nations say they support loss and damage finance, but need to work through details, such as who would govern any financial facilities and how money would be disbursed.
● Welcomes the Parties’ agreement on all the institutional arrangements of the Santiago Network for averting, minimizing and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change to enable its full operationalization, supports its mandated role in catalyzing technical assistance for the implementation of the relevant approaches at the local, national and regional levels in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and renews their determination to select the host of the Santiago Network Secretariat by 2023 through a selection process which is conducted in an open, transparent, fair and neutral manner in accordance with the process outlined in paragraphs 17-18 of CMA/**** COP/****.
● {Placeholder for Funding Arrangements}.
Need for funding arrangements to address L&D
● {Placeholder for relevant outcomes from the ongoing negotiations} MDBs and Parties to do more to support actions to address L&D
● {Placeholder for relevant outcomes from the ongoing negotiations}
Transparency
Reporting under the enhanced transparency framework
● Recognizes the importance of increase support to developing countries for the implementation of the enhanced transparency framework under article 13 of the PA in a timely, adequate and predictable manner.
Cooperation and cross-cutting action
Cooperation under Article 6
● {Placeholder for relevant outcomes from the ongoing negotiations}
With research published last year showing that many countries are misreporting emissions, including that of the powerful greenhouse gas methane, the calls for transparency are more important than ever. In the UN jargon, transparency is covered by MRV, which means measurement, reporting and verification of emissions, and it has long been an issue.
Some countries are reluctant to submit to any external oversight of their emissions, seeing it as an infringement of their national sovereignty.
But if emissions cannot be properly verified, the world’s efforts to stay within 1.5C will be hampered. Key countries whose emissions are questionable include Russia and Saudi Arabia, two of the world’s biggest oil and gas producers and emitters.
● Decides that REDD-plus results assessed and verified under Article 5.2 [post 2016] may be submitted under Article 6.2.
Response measures
● {Placeholder for relevant outcomes from the ongoing negotiations}
● Takes note of the conclusion of consideration of the Katowice Committee on Impacts of the implementation of response measures annual reports 2019 and 2021–22 by the forum on the impacts of the implementation of response measures.
● Welcomes the SBSTA and SBI concluding the midterm review of the workplan of the forum and its KCI with a view to enhancing effectiveness of the forum.
● Ensures that response measures are linked to all mitigation policies and the negative economic and social consequences of the implementation of response measures are addressed and averted.
Relevant domestic and international efforts/ Cooperative initiatives from the Glasgow Climate Pact
● Welcomes the announcement and further implementation of various mitigation-related initiatives since Glasgow;
● Calls upon Parties to take further action to reduce by 2030 non-carbon dioxide GHG emissions;
Relevant work by ICAO and IMO
● Covered above.
Special needs and special circumstances of Africa
● {Placeholder for relevant outcomes from the ongoing negotiations}
Ocean and climate change
● Welcomes the informal summary report by the Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on the Ocean and Climate Change dialogue 2022, held on 15 June 2022, on how to strengthen ocean-based action on climate change;
● Encourages Parties to consider including, as appropriate, ocean-based action in their communications and reports, including but not limited to nationally determined contributions, long-term strategies, and adaptation communications;
● Recognizes the findings of the recent best available science, as well as traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems;
● Requests that the reports under para. 60, 1/CP.26 be made available to the annual dialogue;
● Encourages Parties to: consider, as appropriate, sustainable ocean-based climate mitigation and adaptation action in their national climate goals or in the implementation of these goals, including but not limited to nationally determined contributions, long-term strategies, and adaptation communications; and enhance cooperation between the UNFCCC and other international organizations and processes, including the UN Ocean Conferences, while respecting existing mandates and avoiding duplication.
● Decides that the annual Ocean and Climate Change dialogue will, from 2023, be facilitated by two co-facilitators, selected by Parties, and invites the SBSTA Chair, in coordination with the co-facilitators, to select and define focused thematic areas in advance of the dialogue, in consultation with Parties and observers, including on progress of UNFCCC work programmes and constituted bodies to integrate and strengthen ocean-based action (as invited in 1/CP.26 para 60);
Role of forests
● Recalls that, in the context of the provision of adequate and predictable support to developing country Parties, Parties should collectively aim to slow, halt and reverse forest cover and carbon loss, in accordance with national circumstances, consistent with the ultimate objective of the Convention, as stated in its Article 2;
● Recalls the IPCC findings that GHG emissions reductions and removals from forests and land use are essential to all pathways to global net zero and the critical role that healthy forests serve in climate regulation, biodiversity protection, food and water security, soil fertility and limiting forced migration;
● Recognizes the urgent need for public and private finance to significantly scale up support for REDD+ results assessed and verified under Article 5.2 when meeting Nationally Determined Contributions or fulfilling net-zero claims;
Sustainable lifestyles
● Notes the importance of transition to sustainable lifestyles and sustainable patterns of consumption and production for the efforts to address climate change;
Education
● Also notes the importance of an educational approach that promotes new lifestyles, while fostering a renewed pattern of development and sustainability based on care, fraternity and cooperation.
Global stocktake and periodic review
Status and importance of the GST process
● Welcomes the progress of the first global stocktake and notes with appreciation the balanced, comprehensive and inclusive nature of the first technical dialogue of the stocktake;
● Also welcomes the invitation of the United Nations Secretary General to convene a climate ambition summit in 2023 ahead of the conclusion of the first global stocktake at COP 28 and CMA 5;
The global stocktake, required under the Paris agreement, means assessing countries’ successes – or otherwise – in meeting their NDCs, and the policies and measures they have in place to reduce emissions. It is due next year, and is the main mechanism for ensuring countries are fulfilling their promises.
It is important for language on the global stocktake to be included this year, but expect fireworks next year when countries have to submit to scrutiny.
● Emphasizes that the outcome of the global stocktake shall inform Parties in updating and enhancing, in a nationally determined manner, their actions and support in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, as well as in enhancing international cooperation for climate action;
● Urges all stakeholders involved in the first global stocktake to focus on achieving the outcome referred to in Article 14, paragraph 3, of the Paris Agreement;
● Expresses appreciation to the co-facilitators of the technical dialogue for their efforts to deliver the second meeting of that dialogue, in a robust, holistic, and inclusive manner consistent with Article 14 of the Paris Agreement and decision 19/CMA.1.
● Welcomes and encourages the active engagement of Parties and non-Party stakeholders in providing inputs and participating in the activities of the Technical Dialogue
● Further welcomes the conclusions of the 57th session of the SBSTA and SBI, on the need for additional activities to be undertaken over the course of 2023 as part of the consideration of outputs component of the global stocktake, including, inter alia, holding intersessional workshops and inviting the high-level committee referred to in paragraph 33 of decision 19/CMA.1 to provide an update during the fifty-eighth sessions of the subsidiary bodies (June 2023) on progress in planning their high-level events.
● Welcomes progress towards the Global Stocktake, invites the UNSG to discuss high level outputs of the GST, as part of his 2023 Leaders’ Summit and calls on Presidency to prepare for a GST that is inclusive, balanced, comprehensive and focused Party-driven process, with the participation of nonParty stakeholders.
● Recognizes the significance of the global stocktake as the ambition ratcheting mechanism under the Paris Agreement
● Emphasizes the need for Parties to work towards an ambitious outcome to the Global Stocktake at the fifth session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement that enables Parties to enhance their actions and support, including Nationally Determined Contributions, as well as deliver a step change in international collaboration)
Second periodic review
● {Placeholder for relevant outcomes from the ongoing negotiations}
Action by non-Party stakeholders
Role of non-Party stakeholders, including youth and children, women and girls, cities and local communities, indigenous peoples
● Expresses its appreciation to the Presidency of the Conference of the Parties and the children and youth constituency for organizing the youth-led forum and urges Parties to include youth in their processes for designing and implementing climate policy and action, recognizing the importance of intergenerational equity and maintaining the stability of the climate system for future generations;
● Recognizes the role of children and youth as agents of change in addressing and responding to climate change by urging future Presidencies of the Conference of the Parties to continue to appoint youth envoys, and to promote the full, meaningful and equal participation of children and youth including through continuing to host the Children and Youth Pavilion launched for the first time at COP27 in Sharm El Sheikh.
● Notes the outcomes from the seventeenth Conference of Youth, organized by the constituency of children and youth non-governmental organizations and held in Sharm El Sheikh in November 2022;
● Welcomes the holding of the first Youth-led climate forum (hereafter, the Sharm Youth Climate Dialogue) pursuant to paragraph 65 of the and a meaningful arrangement to ensure visibility and impact for the global youth policy statement, and urges future presidencies in full collaboration with YOUNGO and other Youth Organizations, and with the support of the UNFCCC secretariat to continue to champion and develop this forum and support its progressive development and substantive impact.
● Welcomes the appointment of the first COP Presidency’s Youth Envoy as a further step towards strengthening the COP Presidencies’ approaches towards youth climate engagement and dialogue, and encourages future incoming presidencies to consider to do the same.
● Encourages Parties to take further steps towards deepening their engagement with youth with regard to policy planning, implementation and advocacy including through periodic and institutional dialogue, and, as appropriate, to consider including young representatives and negotiators into their national delegations, and further to consider making public information about the measures they undertake to support youth participation at the climate conversation at the local, national, regional, continental and international levels.
● Urges Parties to address the differentiated impacts of climate change on children and youth, including girls and women, inter alia, by collecting, using and reporting disaggregated data, with a view of strengthening gender, youth and child responsive climate action policies that consistently ensure the full respect and enjoyment of human rights by children and youth.
● Invites the secretariat to consider supporting children and youth’s meaningful participation including by exploring means and ways by improvements to allocation of badges quotas and equitably distributing them globally.
Engagement of the private sector
● Affirms that achieving the objective of the Convention and the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement requires extensive collaboration among all levels of government, the private sector and civil society;
Global climate action in the UNFCCC process (Marrakesh Partnership, etc.)
● Encourages Parties and non-Party stakeholders to engage actively in Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action initiatives;
● Welcomes the leadership of the High-Level Champions, including in the context of the Breakthrough Agenda, and collaboration between Parties and non-Party stakeholders, and emphasizes the need for continued acceleration and collaboration;
● Invites the High-Level Champions and secretariat to prepare a synthesis report on progress of initiatives with regard to the for Global Climate Action and the Breakthrough Agendas.
● Welcomes the Sharm el-Sheikh Adaptation Agenda that aims at rallying both states and non-state actors behind a shared set of adaptation actions.
Accountability of action by non-Party stakeholders
● Welcomes the recommendations of the High-Level Expert Group on the Net-Zero Emissions Commitments of Non-State Entities, launched by the United Nations Secretary-General in June 2022, which are designed to enhance transparency and accountability related to, and progress in achieving, the climate pledges of businesses, investors, cities and regions;
● Invites the secretariat, in consultation with the High-Level Champions, to ensure greater accountability on voluntary initiatives and pledges as means to revise the membership and working arrangements of the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action, building on the work of the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action platform;
ACE
● Welcomes the adoption of the first action plan under the Glasgow work programme on Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE), which sets out short-term, clear and time-bound activities in the four priority areas of the Glasgow work programme and across the six elements of ACE in a balanced manner as a concrete step towards empowering all members of society, including youth, to engage in climate action.
The breakthrough agenda refers to businesses that are reducing their greenhouse gas emissions, often using a sectoral approach that covers all or many of the biggest companies in a given high-emitting sector – such as steel, road transport and hydrogen – and agreeing ways for them to collaborate and cut emissions. Note there is no mention of the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero, which brought together banks and other investors with more than $130tn under management, spearheaded by the former Bank of England governor Mark Carney at Cop26.
GFANZ has been beset by controversy as it turns out some of its 500-plus members continue to invest in coal and other fossil fuels, many having been attracted by the huge financial returns from fossil fuels at present.
Businesses have a clear role to play in the move to net zero, but the question of how to move the global financial system away from fossil fuels has not been resolved. Next year, Cop28 will be held in United Arab Emirates – the world’s third biggest oil producer.
What does it mean?
This unwieldy draft reflects nearly every element that has been discussed in any form at this Cop. Proponents of climate action will be cheered by the language affirming the importance of 1.5C, the phase down of coal, and a commitment to doubling finance for adaptation.
But they will want to see a clearer and more prominent commitment to the 1.5C limit in the next version of this text, and a commitment to commission a formal report on how coal is to be urgently phased down, rather than the vague promise of an eventual phase down that’s in there at present.
But as the placeholders show, some of the most contentious issues – chiefly loss and damage – have yet to be resolved. With Cop scheduled to end at 6pm Egyptian time (4pm GMT) on Friday, talks will almost certainly carry on into Saturday, but with countries so far apart still on key issues there appears to be little resolution in sight.
A final settlement of loss and damage was always unlikely at these talks, but the fact that countries are now talking about it in a detailed way is a step forward. If progress can be made on the key issue of World Bank reform outside these talks, it would open up far greater possibilities.
