The story so far: On May 5, five soldiers were killed and another was injured in a gunfight with militants in the Rajouri-Poonch sector of Jammu division. According to the Army, the gunfight broke out after an explosive device was triggered when a search team established contact with a group of terrorists hiding in a cave in the Kandi forests, killing two soldiers. On April 26, an IED (improvised explosive device) killed 10 security personnel of the District Reserve Guard in Chattisgarh’s Dantewada area. The jawans were out on an anti-Maoist mission when they were ambushed.
Were any tactical mistakes made?
The quintessential dilemma for security forces is that they are dealing with an enemy who is faceless, unidentifiable and hidden among the people. Wedded to upholding the law of the land and protecting its people, security personnel can open fire only in self-defence, not on apprehension. Militants, whether they are the Lashkar-e-Taiba in Kashmir or the Maoists in central India, have the ‘first mover advantage’, on triggering a landmine or an IED on a mobile Army vehicle or opening burst fire with an AK- 47 on a static CRPF sentry post.
In all such scenarios, particularly in landmine/IED ambushes, the reaction or the response time available for what is called “Immediate Action (IA) or Counter Ambush drill” is a few seconds, and that too, if a few of the security personnel are lucky enough to survive the initial IED ambush. Hence, all standard operating systems and procedures, technological measures etc. are directed towards identification and detection of IEDs/landmines and to avoid being caught in them.
How can errors be minimised?
The first thing that must be kept in mind is to avoid travel by vehicle. The safest mode of travel is on foot in a region where left-wing extremism is active. Studies show that over 60% of casualties/fatalities in Maoist territories are because of vehicles ambushed in landmines/IEDs, as also seen in the recent Chhattisgarh incident. Routine operations like area domination, cordon-and-search, long range patrolling, ambush-cum-patrolling and so forth should only be undertaken on foot. Vehicle travel should be undertaken rarely and that too, only for urgent operational reasons, after exercising due diligence.
If vehicle travel is absolutely essential, the onward and return journeys should never be by the same route, nor undertaken during the day time. A little-known fact is that Maoists, to avoid the risk of civilian casualties, neither trigger IEDs during night time, nor use anti-personnel/pressure induced mines. The exact timing of triggering IEDs is also an issue during night time. Hence, night travel by vehicles is relatively safe for security forces. Unfortunately, in most instances, the security forces travelled during daytime and that too by the same route, resulting in fatalities.
Will moving around in camouflage help?
Stealth, camouflage and concealment are integral to anti-terrorist operations. Olive green vehicles of the Army and light green vehicles of the CRPF are easily identified from a distance, giving adequate time and opportunity to terrorists to organise an IED ambush. If vehicle travel is absolutely essential, security forces are expected to take civilian or State Road Transport Corporation buses. To avoid easy identification, they must travel with civilians in mufti with weapons carefully concealed.
What about armoured vehicles and other protective gear?
In certain war zones, vehicular deployment is inevitable. Security forces working in such areas should be equipped with appropriate protective gear, such as blast-resistant clothing, helmets, and eye protection. Their vehicles should also be equipped with V-shaped and armour-plated hull, blast-resistant technology and proper sandbagging to minimise damage in the event of an explosion. Machine guns and other weapons should be mounted on top of the vehicles with outward facing rotatory seats, from where the men can have a 360-degree observation outside.
Also, security forces should always travel in a convoy of minimum two to three vehicles, maintaining a distance of at least 40 to 50 metres between them, so that even if one vehicle is caught in a landmine, the personnel in other vehicles are able to take positions and neutralise the threat.
How can a region be made safe for travel?
Rigorous and regular implementation of various detection methods, such as metal detectors, ground-penetrating radar, and trained sniffer dogs, to locate and clear landmines and IEDs, is essential. Road opening parties play an important role in detection of ambushes. Aerial surveillance carried out through drones and road opening parties equipped with UGVs (Unmanned Ground Vehicles), can not only detect the presence of terrorists to carry out operations but also pick tell-tale signs of a likely ambush like piles of rock and mud bags, dugout portions on the sides of the roads, and absence of people or movement of other vehicles.
Based on the above inputs, areas known or suspected to contain landmines or IEDs can be mapped and contingency plans prepared for them. This includes establishing safe routes, setting up checkpoints, and creating evacuation plans as part of both preventive and mitigation measures.
What about Intelligence inputs?
While it is important to gather actionable intelligence, due to enormous risks of reprisals by terrorists, locals usually do not divulge information for money alone. Winning of hearts and minds is neither easy nor quick. Relationships have to be cultivated and goodwill generated among the local population on a long-term basis beyond and above transactional levels. This requires patience, commitment, empathy and integrity on the part of security forces, which is sometimes lacking.
What can be learnt from an explosion?
There is simply no substitute for good, old routine investigation of crimes, including that of IED ambushes. An IED ambush is not an insular, standalone event. There is a whole ecosystem behind it, comprising of financiers, suppliers, transporters, builders and triggermen. It is pertinent to mention here that in just one year alone (2008-9) in Afghanistan, the U.S. forensic investigation teams picked up a mindboggling 5,000 finger prints from the remnants of IEDs and explosives, recovered from the scenes of bomb blasts. This enabled identification and detection of hundreds of suspects and accomplices involved in IED ambushes. Diligent and scientific investigation, establishment of linkages through meticulous collection and marshalling of evidence, framing of chargesheets, followed by speedy trials and conviction, serve as a strong deterrent to terrorism.
What are some of the other measures that need to be undertaken?
Several measures need to be undertaken at the government level, both at the Centre and States. These include collaboration with international organisations, NGOs, and other countries to share information, resources, and best practices for landmine and IED prevention, detection, and clearance; implementation and enforcement of national and international laws, policies, and regulations aimed at preventing the use, production, and trade of landmines and IEDs.
Legislative measures are required for mandatory addition of odoriferous chemicals and/or biosensors to explosives used in industry and mining etc. for their easy detection during transport. Likewise, legislative measures are required for stricter controls on manufacture, supply and sale of explosives and detonators. Other countries have taken several counter-IED measures spending billions. The U.S., for example, set up the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization to “prevent, identify and defeat IEDs” and has spent about $20 billion on counter IED measures since 2005. NATO’s Counter-IED Centre of Excellence is based in Madrid; a small unit exists in India under the National Security Guard. But given that IEDs have been causing major setbacks to fighting militants in India, it is high time that an overarching agency is created under the Ministry of Home Affairs to coordinate the efforts of both the Government of India and the State governments, and to provide legislative, technological and procedural support to law enforcement agencies.
Santosh Mehra, IPS, is former DG, NHRC & DG, APSPF
