Following Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky’s already infamous row in the Oval Office, transatlantic relations are taking a nosedive. In the days following the meeting, Trump has cut all military aid to Ukraine, leaving Europe to face the prospect of similar treatment in the near future.
European nations, including the UK, have shown unity in the immediate aftermath, with a swiftly convened summit in the UK and hefty financial commitments to both defend Ukraine and “rearm” Europe.
Citizens broadly support this shift towards militarisation. In a recent Eurobarometer survey, 79% of respondents supported increased EU-level defence cooperation, with 65% agreeing that defence spending should be augmented within the EU.
However, implementing a new defence strategy will mean answering many difficult questions, including whether an EU defence force would involve all EU member states, the potential roles of antagonistic EU members like Hungary and Slovakia (both pro-Trump and pro-Russia), and those of non-EU Nato members such as the UK, Norway, or even Canada.
Questions of who would lead such an initiative are also up in the air. Currently, Germany’s newly-elected Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, is leading the charge with his calls to “achieve independence from the USA”.
As the bloc’s largest economy, Germany would by default bankroll a significant amount of any European defence force, but this reflects a paradigm shift in the continent’s defence landscape. Six decades ago, a military union would have been unthinkable, as France staunchly opposed German rearmament throughout the 20th century.
Even at the end of the Cold War in 1990, nuclear non-proliferation was a condition of Germany’s reunification. As things stand, France and the UK are Europe’s only nuclear powers – much of the continent’s nuclear deterrent takes the form of US nuclear missiles stationed throughout its territory.
A European Nato without the US?
Currently, Nato has 32 members, including all EU member states except for the neutral countries of Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, and Malta. Other European Nato members include the UK, Norway, Iceland, Albania, Montenegro, and Turkey, along with the US and Canada.
A European defence effort would most likely use Nato as its framework, but without active US participation. This would mean all EU member states that are also in Nato would be included, supported by Canada and non-EU Nato members like the UK and potentially Turkey. Doing so would maintain an intergovernmental approach to European defence, and reduce dependence on the US.
To replace the US’s role, however, other Nato members would need to step up. Nato military planners assume that in the event of a Russian attack on a European Nato country, the 100,000 US troops in Europe would be rapidly reinforced by up to 200,000 additional US troops, supported by other Nato members and American strategic assets.
A credible European deterrent – one that could prevent, for instance, a rapid Russian incursion in the Baltics – would need a minimum of 1,400 tanks, 2,000 infantry fighting vehicles, and 700 artillery pieces. This is more combat power than currently exists in the combined French, German, Italian, and British land forces.
Additionally, Europe would need to develop aviation, transport, missile, drone warfare, communication, and intelligence capabilities, while also recruiting and training 300,000 new personnel to replace US troops.
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Financial commitment to EU defence
Defending Europe without the US will mean spending big, and the European Commission has pledged to do just this.
The recently announced “ReArm Europe” package includes a five-part plan to raise nearly €800 billion. It will bolster Europe’s defence industry and enhance military capabilities, and provide urgent military support for Ukraine following the suspension of US aid. The proposed measures, presented on March 4, include increased fiscal space for defence investments, €150 billion in loans, and the mobilisation of private capital. It will be discussed at the next European Council meeting on March 6.
The EU’s response to Trump – in diplomacy and trade as well as defence – has thus far been proactive, recognising that fragmentation of the bloc would be the only alternative.
However, if Nato can no longer serve as the framework for Europe’s defence, the EU will need to consider a specific EU defence strategy. This approach would be even more demanding and could potentially mean creating a whole new intergovernmental institution from scratch. Currently, the most likely scenario involves the emergence of a revitalised Nato, a rearmed Germany, and the creation of an EU Single Market for defence.
Patricia Garcia-Duran Huet receives research funding from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
