This week, President Emmanuel Macron announced the official end of France's anti-jihadist mission in West Africa – Operation Barkhane. The move was accelerated by a collapse of relations with Mali's military junta, leading to the withdrawal of French troops as the jihadist insurgency across the Sahel continues.
At its peak, Operation Barkhane saw up to 5,500 French soldiers deployed in Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mauritania.
But in July of this year, President Macron said that fighting terrorism was "no longer the objective" of Mali’s military junta. That determined France's decision to leave Malian soil, redeploying troops involved in Operation Barkhane to Niger.
Mali's military government lambasted France for being "neo-colonial, paternalistic and condescending".
With a key strategic partnership gone, France had little choice but to call time on Barkhane.
It was an ignominious end to such a long-fought battle – eight years, three months and eight days, to be precise.
Was the deployment worth it?
Speaking to RFI, Wassim Nasr, a journalist and expert on jihadist movements, is quick to acknowledge the achievements of Barkhane and a joint European Special Forces operation in 2020, which together contained the Islamic State in the so-called "three-border region". This vast territory straddles the frontiers of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.
Barkhane and French Special Forces also eliminated prominent jihadi figures "including the leader of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the former head of Islamic State in the Sahel, Abu Walid al-Sahraoui", Nasr explains.
However, the complete collapse in relations between Paris and Bamako – and the subsequent withdrawal of Barkhane's forces from Mali – can be described as the whole operation's "rock bottom".
"The lowest point was when President Macron declared the end of Barkhane three months ago, and the disengagement of the French military," Nasr says.
The lengthy retreat of French troops, which took several months, hurt the operation's efficiency on the ground, he explains.
"During this period of retreat, the ground operations against jihadi groups fell to its lowest standard, even though [military] strikes were still being conducted," he told RFI.
Des opérations de reconnaissance et de contrôle de secteur ont lieu dans les zones de refuges des groupes armés terroristes.
— Armée française - Opération BARKHANE (@BARKHANE_OP) October 8, 2022
La lutte contre la menace terroriste, en appui de nos partenaires, reste la priorité de notre engagement. pic.twitter.com/xA2tmPJok4
Russian mercenaries
One of the greatest diplomatic spanners in the works between Paris and Bamako has been the arrival of the Russian mercenary group Wagner in the region.
Wagner's involvement comes amid growing hostility to France in the Sahel, with protests directed at the French military or embassies in Burkina Faso and Niger.
Russia is suspected of trying to stoke the opposition. During the military takeover in Burkina Faso last month, for instance, Russian flags were waved at rallies in support of the coup plotters with strong anti-French slogans.
Mali's military junta has become more reliant on the irregular Russian forces carrying out joint operations with Malian troops, which have been condemned following reports of mass killings and grave human rights abuses.
However, the mercenaries are not going to fill the void left by the closure of Operation Barkhane. Nasr explains that tackling terrorism in the region is technically impossible for Wagner.
"They are poorly equipped; they are totally dependent on Malian forces to move around. They don't have the independent logistics ... and they don't have air power," he says.
The journalist also underlines the fact that Wagner's actions – alongside Malian forces – have actually fuelled the jihadi movements, especially in central Mali.
This area "saw a peak in recruitment among the ranks of Al-Qaeda to avenge human rights abuses", says Nasr.
The future of G5 Sahel
When unveiling France's new military strategy earlier this week, President Macron said France would “revamp its partnerships and operations in Africa”, referring to a "lighter, more integrated deployment".
What might this look like? And what does it mean for the G5 Sahel – a task force comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and Mauritania – seeking to combat the exponential spread of jihadist groups across West Africa?
"The aim of the G5 was to make the African military work together – that didn't happen," Nasr says.
"France will go back to normal bilateral relations, pushing countries like Niger and Burkina Faso to have bilateral relations with European countries that could help."
France will not be returning to "huge-impact operations" such as Barkhane, which Nasr believes went on "just too long".
There are at least 3,000 French troops still deployed in the region, but their visibility will be diminished and "that's what France wants", Nasr says.
"The best example up to now is what's happening in Niger. It's Niger military who are deciding on the operations. They are calling upon France to help them with some operations without preventing them from having bilateral relations with countries like Turkey," he explains.
This is not the same approach as in Mali, he says, "where France was calling the shots, militarily and politically".
The expansion of Al-Qaeda in the Sahel
Military success, political failure
Now that Operation Barkhane is over – and with the benefit of hindsight – was the mission a success or a failure?
For Nasr, we have to look at it as a military operation, not a diplomatic one.
"If we are talking about the objectives that were given to Barkhane – meaning containing jihadi groups, eliminating jihadi leaders and preventing jihadists from having strong goals that would threaten European or French interests – they succeeded in doing this," he says.
Yet if we consider Barkhane through the prism of political or strategic affairs – such as preventing the rise of jihadist groups in the region – the answer is no.
"France and Barkane cannot, by themselves, find answers to all the problems that led to jihadi enrolment in the Sahel region.
"They have to be backed by local governments and local military, which didn't happen. If political and economic solutions aren't found, the problem will continue to grow," says Nasr.
"When we saw that Barkhane lifted its hand in Mali, there was no more air support, no more special forces operations, we saw that jihadist factions had a much larger scope acting in this region," Nasr concludes, "and it will have an impact on surrounding countries."
As Barkhane is closed down, Al-Qaeda is flourishing in southern Mali, on the border with Côte d'Ivoire and all the way over to Senegal, as there is no counterinsurgent activity there.
And when there's no military activity, there will certainly be jihadist expansion.
Full Interview: 'No longer our problem': The legacy of Operation Barkhane - Wassim Nasr
