The future of Europe may very well be determined in large part by NATO’s reaction to the invasion of Ukraine. Less than two weeks into Vladimir Putin’s war, the evidence strongly suggests the alliance is pulling together.
At the center of that story is Europe’s largest economy, Germany, and its sudden and remarkable decision to double down on its place within NATO — in a way that seemed impossible even a month ago.
On the eve of war, history suggested that Germany would seek to moderate any NATO reaction to Russian aggression, as it had to Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the continued fighting in eastern Ukraine.
While NATO member states (particularly the U.S. and United Kingdom) had sent Ukraine lethal and nonlethal military hardware Germany, the world’s fourth-largest arms exporter, had offered only to supply 5,000 steel helmets. The incredulous mayor of Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, responded by asking, “What kind of support will Germany send next? Pillows?”
German government representatives argued that they didn’t “want to fuel the situation,” following their long-standing policy of not selling weapons into active combat zones.
Last month, Germany also appeared ill-prepared to assist NATO in defending itself. Over the last 20 years, Germany has repeatedly cut its defense spending, with funding levels well below NATO’s 2% threshold. German soldiers lack basic hardware and spare parts. A review published by the National Review in 2020 indicated that most branches of the German military were incapable of assisting NATO in a crisis.
Germany also appeared unwilling to confront Putin in strong terms. Some of that reluctance stems from the importance of trade between Russia and Germany. But in addition, the dominant party in Germany’s new ruling coalition, the Social Democratic Party, or SPD, has long had a complicated relationship with Moscow.
Throughout the Cold War, the SPD sought rapprochement with Moscow, favoring “balance” between East and West. That view continued after the end of the Cold War: In 2014, SPD politicians were quick to recommend acceptance of the Russian seizure of Crimea.
More sinister was the case of former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. While in office, he was the architect of the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline system directly connecting Russia and Germany via the Baltic Sea — circumventing existing pipelines in Ukraine. He signed the pipeline agreement just days before leaving office in 2005, then was immediately hired by Russian energy firm Gazprom as chairman of the shareholders’ committee of the holding company overseeing Nord Stream.
Unsurprisingly, he publicly backed Putin’s narrative on Ukraine in 2014, leading one German lawmaker to describe him as “Putin’s propagandist.” The growing frequency of corruption scandals involving Russian money and German elites seems to suggest he is not an outlier, either.
But over the last week, the government of current SPD Chancellor Olaf Scholz has repeatedly moved in step with NATO partners in a way not seen in years. First, Scholz announced he would halt the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which would have doubled German gas imports from Russia. Then, he suddenly reversed course on sanctions involving the SWIFT financial transactions system, backing much more extensive measures against Russia.
On Saturday, the German government abandoned its long-standing policy of not selling weapons into active combat zones, transferring 500 anti-aircraft and 1,000 anti-tank weapons from its own stockpiles to Ukraine, as well as assisting in the transit of such weapons from neighboring NATO states.
The most dramatic shift came Feb. 27, as Scholz told a special session of the Bundestag, Germany’s parliament, that the Russian invasion marked “a turning point in the history of our continent,” which required a strong response. Surprising even his own party, he announced an immediate increase in military spending, with a fund of 100 billion euros established to modernize its own weapons.
More remarkably, he proposed embedding military spending requirements in the German constitution to guarantee military preparedness in the future.
The question remains what all of this portends for the future, but the signs point to a radical reorientation of German foreign policy, from a balancing act between Moscow and Washington to a firm commitment to NATO and European security.
Germany’s place in the European response is a particularly important one, as Berlin has long been reluctant — primarily due to bad memories of 1914 to 1945 — to emphasize its own leadership within Europe. A month ago, The New York Times described Scholz as under fire for “his lack of leadership in one of the most serious security crises in Europe” since 1991. But he is certainly no longer the “invisible man” some pundits claimed as he projects a stronger German commitment to democracy and European security.
Lord Hastings Ismay, NATO’s first secretary-general, once quipped that the organization’s aim was to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” The first two adages may remain true, but the last is clearly history.
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ABOUT THE WRITER
Ian Johnson is the P.J. Moran Family assistant professor of military history at the University of Notre Dame and an expert on German-Russian relations.
