While it is premature to declare Russia’s invasion of Ukraine over, with Ukrainians dying in the Donbas region every day, it is critical to lay the foundation for what a postwar Ukraine would look like.
Ukraine has a history of discrete events of dissatisfaction with the status quo, heralding important change, but without plans on what is to come next. From its independence from the Soviet Union to the Orange Revolution of 2004 and 2005 to the Maidan “Revolution of Dignity” in 2014, initial momentum toward promising reforms stalled without a concrete plan on how to institutionalize a new, liberal-minded Ukraine. It is thus imperative that Ukrainian policymakers and foreign donors have a list of tangible, specific actions to undertake immediately.
The 2022 Ukraine Recovery Conference, concluding in Lugano, Switzerland, was the first iteration of such a document, bringing donors and Ukrainian authorities together to attempt to find a common language regarding postwar Ukraine. The interest and attendance at the conference showed that the landscape for donor assistance to Ukraine is stronger than it has been in years, galvanized by the humanitarian disaster and the realization that a resilient Ukraine remains a bulwark against a revanchist Russia.
As a first attempt, the document produced was long on goals but short on specifics, as the Ukrainian government presented what was more a collection of wishes rather than a real plan. At times, it appeared that the Ukrainian delegation came to the conference to fundraise for the recovery in general rather than to present a coherent strategy. Moreover, Western partners brought many representatives of Ukrainian civil society to the conference, to signal that they see such organizations as an integral part of reconstruction.
The Ukrainian delegation had extensively consulted such partners but, in the end, appeared to be fixated on government-led initiatives. Indeed, the Ukrainian government appeared to be working too hard to satisfy donors in order to ensure the funding is queued up, by saying the right phrases.
However, the rebuilding and (still far too delayed) transformation of a country as important as Ukraine needs a better mechanism to bring the actual needs of the country to the fore. Our efforts as heads of a Swiss-Polish-Ukrainian initiative have worked on clarifying these needs and actions that are required in Ukraine once the war is over.
In particular, we propose that a blueprint for Ukraine’s recovery should concentrate on three themes. The first group of reforms should focus on European integration. In some sense, the necessary reforms are already defined in the action plan on Implementation of the European Union-Ukraine Association Agreement . There is a substantial amount of political will committed to completing the rest, which includes increasing the access of Ukrainian agricultural goods to the EU market on a permanent basis.
The second group of reforms is more in the hands of Ukraine and should ensure creating a friendly business environment that will compensate for the risks people and businesses face when operating in postwar Ukraine. These crucial areas include a massive and concerted effort toward deregulation, along the lines of Poland’s Balcerowicz Plan of 1989, as well as donors helping push substantial judicial reforms, including a revival of anti-corruption infrastructure. At the same time, the country is long overdue for streamlining its tax and customs procedures, privatizing its state-owned enterprises and liberalizing its energy market further.
The final group of reforms should center on institutional strengthening of Ukrainian society, including continuing the liberalization of the land market, which was on hold for 20 years until President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was able to force through a repeal of the land sale moratorium. Along these lines, the success of decentralization, a reform that has helped the country be more resilient in the face of invasion, needs to be continued. Building on prewar momentum, the Ukrainian government should continue to develop its amalgamated territorial communities, including increasing accountability of land and real estate assets within communities.
These are necessarily broader areas, and specific actions under these headings need to be formulated to point the government in the right direction. Additionally, however, and at a nascent stage in Lugano, is the reality that donors have not yet begun to think of the mechanisms needed to make this aid effort effective.
For all of its advances since Maidan, corruption in Ukraine is still problematic. The infusion of massive amounts of donor funding will likely stoke even more political jockeying for the spoils. We propose that funding should be exchanged for and targeted specifically at reforms, with officials responsible for the disbursement of funding evaluating progress closely. In this manner, rather than a money dump, funds would be managed and disbursed based on specific reforms.
On the day the war ends, the Ukrainian government needs to have a clear vision of what is to be done, how it will be done and — crucially for explaining reforms — why this plan was chosen and not one of the competing alternatives. Now is precisely the right time to push a discussion on the postwar recovery of Ukraine and precisely what needs to be done to allow Ukraine to avoid missing a historical (and perhaps greatest) chance for a transformative leap.
