Very few bureaucrats can claim to have worked as closely for two Indian Prime Ministers, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, as Chinmaya R. Gharekhan. In his new book Centres of Power: My Years in the Prime Minister’s Office and Security Council, which follows his earlier book Horseshoe Table: An Inside View of the UN Security Council, the Indian and UN diplomat discusses his time in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), and the making of Indian foreign policy. Excerpts from an interview.
You worked closely with two different Prime Ministers. Even though one was the son of the other, their foreign policy styles are clearly different as you write. What were the major differences?
Rajiv Gandhi wanted to set a part for himself, he did not want to be known as Indira Gandhi’s son in foreign policy, or domestic politics for that matter. Every time somebody said Mrs. Gandhi had said so and so, he would resent it. One instance of that was on Sri Lanka: G. Parthasarathi (senior PMO official) said “this was your mother’s policy” and Rajiv’s reply was rather brusque, he said, “Well this is my policy, and this shall be the policy for today.” We all knew how far India was supporting the Tamil Tigers revolt with bases in Tamil Nadu etc. While we wouldn’t admit that, Rajiv Gandhi tried his best to have those camps demolished, and then kept GP out of the decision-making on Sri Lanka.
In 1985, the PMO had a massive spy scandal, when a ring of bureaucrats passing on information to various foreign embassies was busted. How did that affect Indian diplomacy?
The Intelligence Bureau had been tracking this for a long time. Indira Gandhi once confided in me that she believed there was a CIA agent in her office. This was not paranoia. It was a genuine belief. But it wasn’t till years later, in Rajiv Gandhi’s time, that this huge network was unearthed. There were various embassies involved in the scandal, including the Russians, the French and others. Rajiv Gandhi seemed quite calm about it. The Principal Secretary (P.C. Alexander) resigned, and that was that.
You’ve described your time at the United Nations during the first Gulf war. Are there parallels to India’s position over Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022?
While no one supports an invasion, sometimes it is the wording of resolutions at the UN Security Council that India is unable to accept. I had to face some embarrassment when the Kuwait Foreign Minister met with our External Affairs Minister, I.K. Gujral. Mr. Gujral said: “We are with you 120%.” The FM replied, “100% is enough for us, and you can use the 20% remaining to condemn Saddam Hussein’s actions in the UNSC!” I had a lot of problem with the MEA on condemning the invasion. So eventually we only said India stands for territorial integrity and sovereignty, like we are doing now for Ukraine. I think we could afford to take a stronger position [on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine] than what we have done.
Given all that you have covered in your diplomatic career, do you think that in international terms, “India’s time” has come now?
India’s time has always been there. One reads and hears a lot about India’s moment having come. Much of this, I think is a public relations exercise. Prime Minister Modi has skills at communication. And he has a certain style which his immediate predecessor, and others did not have. For example, he puts his arm around other leaders. As Indians, we like flattery. In the 1980s, foreign dignitaries would tell Rajiv Gandhi that only India could convince Russia to pull out of Afghanistan, and Rajiv believed that.
You served in the UN for several years. Is India any closer to a seat at the UN Security Council today?
Actually, I don’t think India is any closer to achieving its objective than it was 20 years ago. There has always been a huge sentiment in the UN in favour of so-called reform of the Security Council, meaning expansion. We did make it happen once in 1965, the membership was increased to 15 and India had a big role in that. In 1990, we revived the idea of reform, and they set up committees to look into it. Two questions remain — how many permanent members will be inducted, and whether they will be given veto powers. China will never allow India or Japan to become permanent members on their own. Any resolution will have to be a package deal. And none of the other P-5 members want another veto-wielding country especially after the Ukraine war. I think they are just playing a “good cop bad cop” game with us.
Centres of Power: My Years in the Prime Minister’s Office and Security Council; Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, Rupa, ₹795.
suhasini.h@thehindu.co.in
