Britain and France are trying, with Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, to develop a peace plan to end the fighting in his country, in the aftermath of his disastrous White House summit with Donald Trump.
However, the initiative announced by Keir Starmer on Sunday raises questions about whether peace is possible, and on what terms, in the face of continuing Russian hostility and uncertain US intentions.
Is peace achievable in the current climate?
Though both Ukraine and Russia say they want an end to the war, the countries remain a long way from agreement.
The Kremlin still wants to dominate Ukraine, seize large amounts of territory and ensure that Kyiv does not join Nato. Ukraine, meanwhile, is fighting for its survival – and to establish a secure independent future within the western sphere. “My view is that what Russia wants, the US can’t deliver and the Ukrainians won’t accept,” says Sir Lawrence Freedman, an emeritus professor at King’s College London.
Though Ukraine has indicated it may accept a de facto partition roughly along the current front lines, it will almost certainly want to fight on rather than accept more onerous terms. Most Ukrainians do not want to fall under a Russian sphere of influence. The desire to resist Russian domination remains widespread across Ukrainian society.
What happens if the US abandons Ukraine?
Friday’s fiasco at the White House has left the diplomatic relationship between the US and Ukraine in tatters, raising the question of whether the US would move to cut all future military aid to Kyiv, its single most powerful piece of short-term leverage. Though there is nearly $4bn of unallocated military aid left, from approvals granted during the previous Biden administration, there were hints on Friday it could be cut immediately.
A halt to US military aid would make the battlefield situation more difficult for Ukraine, though it would take time to take effect. Ukrainian defence officials estimate that about 20% of the military hardware being used in the war comes from the US (plus about 55% from Ukraine and 25% from Europe), though it is acknowledged that the 20% is among the most capable – and the hardest to replace by Europe or elsewhere.
But while Ukraine remains largely on the defensive, Russian advances into Ukraine were slow during 2024 and came at high rates of casualties, often more than 1,000 killed and wounded a day. No significant towns were seized, and it would take Moscow two more years to capture the rest of Donetsk region in the east, at last year’s rate of advance, according to the Institute for the Study of War.
Can Europe plug the gap in US military support?
It is hard to see how Europe can replace everything that the US provides, meaning that Ukraine’s military situation will remain difficult. Rachel Ellehuus, the director general of the Royal United Services Institute, says the US contribution is particularly important in three areas: air defence, where there are only limited European alternatives to Patriot systems; longer-range ballistic missiles, with Germany having declined to give Taurus missiles and Franco-British Storm Shadow missiles in short supply; and, thirdly, satellite communications, where Elon Musk’s Starlink remains critical at the front.
There is also the question of cost. So far, the US has given $33.8bn (£27bn) in arms and ammunition and provided Kyiv with funding for a further $33.2bn to buy US-made weapons. European military aid has been at a near identical monetary level, at €62bn (£51bn) according to the University of Kiel in Germany, meaning that donations would have to double to plug the gap in full. That would be a significant uplift, leading to fresh suggestions that some of Russia’s $300bn in frozen central bank assets should be used to help fund Ukraine’s war effort, though it is unclear if it is legally possible to do so.
Could Europe guarantee a peace in Ukraine without the US?
Though there have been discussions about creating a European-led “reassurance force” to help guarantee a peace in Ukraine, this would require at least a ceasefire. Russia has already said it is opposed to countries that are members of Nato providing peacekeepers, but while it may not be able to exercise a veto over territory it does not control, its opposition would leave European troops in the country in a risky position.
Britain had been pushing for the US to provide a “backstop” to any stabilisation force in Ukraine, most likely in the form of air power, but Starmer did not extract a firm commitment from Trump in his own White House meeting with the US president on Thursday. Friday’s clash between Trump and Zelenskyy made the prospect even less likely, with the US president accusing his counterpart of “gambling with world war three”.
“Is Europe going to get a backstop commitment from the US? I don’t think so,” concluded the former national security adviser Lord Ricketts. That, however, raises the difficult problem of how the safety of European peacekeepers in Ukraine would be guaranteed if Russia were to break whatever truce had given them the confidence to enter the country.
Where does this leave Nato and the transatlantic security alliance?
The evident reality is that, while Trump is president, the compact that underlined European security for decades has disappeared. Europe had been able to prioritise economic development, while the US extended a growing security umbrella extending to almost the entire continent. Now, Trump’s commitment to Nato is uncertain, and it is unclear if all the 100,000 US troops in Europe will remain – and the White House is still keen to pursue direct security talks with Russia.
“It’s been clear for some time that the US has other security priorities – domestically and in the Pacific, where it sees a long-term challenge from China,” said Ellehuus. “It’s something Nato allies have known for a decade, but until now, there has been nothing to shake them into action. Will Nato survive now? That’s a harder question.”
