Defence Secretary Ben Wallace has gone to Washington, like Mr Smith in the movie, this time on unscheduled and urgent business. Three days of meetings at the Pentagon and White House will focus on the dramatic turning point in the Ukraine war and the scary possibilities of what Russia might do next.
President Biden’s top team of security and defence officials will want to know what Britain, and its European allies, plan to do next to maintain support for the Kyiv government and mitigate a range of threats across the region.
The team of Antony Blinken, Jake Sullivan and Lloyd Austin will want to know about the future shape of Britain’s security and strategic capabilities — and whether more cuts are on the way.
An urgent defence review is coming — a new version of the Integrated Review (IR) and the defence blueprint, the Defence Command Paper of last year, are to be delivered within weeks.
An update is essential: so much has changed since March 2021. The new blueprint must be more practical and less aspirational than the IR — much less of the blue skies of “the tilt to the Pacific” and more practical focus on the needs of security, resilience and defence at home and in the near neighbourhood. It must explain to a sceptical public and confused political class the real need for a workable security and strategic posture for troubled times.
Most of the 12 defence reviews since 1945 have led to cuts. Wallace believes the Government must stick to Liz Truss’s pledge to raise defence expenditure to 2.5 per cent of GDP by 2026. Any resile on this makes the necessary reforms all but impossible to realise. For Wallace it could be a resignation issue — and this would mean the loss of a minister with surprisingly enduring popularity with MPs and the party.
The review exercise should be short, sharp and to the point. In 2020 the Australians and later the Finns revised their defence strategy of five years before. The Australians provided a short checklist of what had changed in global security and the threat spectrum to their country since 2016. It then catalogued Australia’s means of managing this scenario. The principal changes in the security spectrum for the UK since March 2021 are only too clear. First, in Ukraine we have combined arms combat in Europe for the first time since 1945 — and this time it is a digital war. Overlaying this is the threat of nuclear weapons being employed, not just deployed. Second, there is the disruptive effect of the pandemic that is likely to be with us for a generation. Third, the fragility of infrastructure, especially in the provision of energy and food, make resilience tasks and capabilities a priority for defence and security at home and abroad.
This naturally leads to a fourth area of security concern — the unpredictable speed and nature of climate change. This is exemplified by the melting of polar ice, desertification of central Asia and Africa and combustion of the tundra. Geographic upheaval should be a focus of geostrategic analysis and planning.
How about the response to the shifting shape of threats? The emphasis should be on being practical and flexible — what works in our forces and what helps them adapt. At present the Danish army, with its Leopard 2 tanks, is a more reassuring presence in Estonia, a Nato ally, than the recently depleted UK presence.
It is surely time to do something about the Byzantine practices of defence procurement. The epitome is the Ajax command and fighting vehicle. In the works for more than 12 years, it has cost £3.5 billion, with not one yet fit to serve.
The forces need to be more collegiate and collective, less indulgent of tribalism and Spanish customs.
Britain’s security and strategy should focus on essential tasks such as homeland defence, support of vital allies and supply protection — and, in present circumstances, nuclear deterrent capability. Next are tasks that are optimum, the choice about working with allies. Finally, there are roles that are desirable but not imperative — much of the froth about “the tilt to the Pacific” and the “Global Britain” shtick fits into this.
Finally, as warfare and security move into the virtual sphere and the metaverse, there is the need for clear communication and language. The deciding contests will be IRW — in the real world — the close battle for house and home. Too much policy discussion ends in convolution and jargon.
Up with this I will not put, Churchill is said to have written. Fact or fiction, he was dead right. Obfuscation is usually a cover for lack of resolve and failure.
