The international community has not beat around the bush on Belarus’ role in Russia’s war against Ukraine. On 2 March, the United Nations issued a historical resolution condemning the country’s “unlawful use of force against Ukraine”. As a result, most of the countries who had adopted sanctions against Russia have now also extended them to Belarus, including the European Union. But whatever Lukashenko’s words, most Belarusians share this anti-war sentiment.
“Belarusians have fought enough of others’ wars”
In September 2019, Belarussian strongman Alexander Lukashenko said something that still captures the average Belarusian’s attitude towards conflict: “Belarusians have fought enough of others’ wars.” Of all the USSR’s republics, Belarus paid the highest price in terms of human casualties to the “Great Patriotic War” – World War II, in Soviet parlance. Belarusians start any of the other wars into which they were “dragged” earlier, as Lukashenko put it. In fact, war aversion is a deeply rooted sentiment in Belarus, and underlaid the aspiration for neutrality and a non-nuclear status built into Belarus’ 1994 Constitution.
Yet the country’s neutrality always was a situational one, Belarus being a founding member of all Russia-led security alliances since their inception. Moreover, it was formally abandoned following a constitutional referendum held on… 27 February 2022.
The now amended article 18 of the constitution posits instead that “the Republic of Belarus rules out military aggression from its territory against other states”. A provision violated before it came into force. Stationed in Belarus since February for snap joint exercises, Russian troops entered Ukraine from the North to take Chernobyl and besiege Kyiv
Since then, missile and air strikes have routinely been launched from Belarusian territory, including strikes on civilian targets.
The constitutional referendum and Lukashenko’s support – albeit reluctant – for Russia’s war prompted protests, which were immediately dispersed. Hundreds of protesters were detained and fined in February and March alone, while several lawyers who expressed concern over the legality of both were disbarred. Anti-war speech, sharing information about the movement of Russian troops or helping outspoken Belarusians relocate to safe countries exposed human-rights defenders, journalists and bloggers to prosecution and long prison sentences on charges of “extremism”.
Other actions included sabotaging Belarusian tracks and trains to slow down shipments of military equipment to Russian troops. At least 52 Belarusians, including 30 railway workers, were thus arrested during the spring. On 29 June, three “rail partisans” who set fire to a relay cabin were charged under article 289 of the Criminal Code (“Act of terrorism”). While nobody was hurt, they could face death penalty due to “aggravating circumstances”. This, of course, had a deterring effect on other would-be anti-war activists, especially after the Belarusian legislation was amended in May to expand the use of capital punishment to anyone “planning” or “attempting” an act of terrorism in organised group.
What do Belarusians think about the conflict?
As in any authoritarian country, it is hard in Belarus to take the pulse of society on issues deemed contentious. Conducting on-the-ground opinion polls has become virtually impossible, as epitomised by the closure, in 2016, of the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies. The only way to independently gauge public opinion is online, with the limitation it implies: respondents might be less afraid of reprisals for speaking out their mind than when polled by phone, but the sample is less representative, as only people with access to a computer and a secure Internet connection can be contacted. With this caveat in mind, since September 2020 a group of Belarusian sociologists in exile, led by Ryhor Astapenya (Centre for New Ideas), has been holding regular polls that reveal how urban and middle class Belarusians feel about the war.
The surveys confirm Belarusians’ attachment to neutrality. In July 2021 for example, only 11% were in favour of “abandoning constitutionally enshrined neutrality”, against 57% who thought that Belarus should preserve and work toward implementing it. By November, that share had risen to 63%, at the expense of the undecided segment of the population – which traditionally represents one in every third or fourth Belarusian. From 2022 onwards, Belarusians became wary of the implications for their own wellbeing of Belarus’ alliance with Russia.
Since 2022, pollsters have been measuring citizens’ attitudes to the war. In January (before it actually started) 57% agreed with the statement that “participating in a war between Ukraine and Russia would be a disaster for Belarus” (32% disagreed). Hence, a majority (58-59%) disapproved of Belarus supporting Russia in case of a war or sending soldiers to fight. An absolute majority viewed negatively (45%) or somewhat negatively (35%) the prospect of Russian nuclear weapons being deployed on the territory of Belarus. The idea that “Belarusian conscripts must not die in a war between Russia and Ukraine” is overwhelmingly supported (79%).
As for the actual participation in the conflict, in March 67% were against the shelling of Ukraine from Belarus, but only 22% at the time considered that Belarus should be qualified as an aggressor. By August, a similar (limited) share of the Belarusian population admitted that the country shared responsibility for the shelling. Throughout the next waves of surveys, the idea that Belarus should take part in the conflict has had little appeal, albeit higher if on Russia’s side (between 3% and 6%), than on Ukraine’s side (1% to 4%). Conversely, the preferred alternatives remain non-engagement (between 38% and 45%) and complete neutrality (on average 25%). Altogether, the share of Belarusians who don’t support Russia’s “military operation” in Ukraine (45% in August 2022) is higher than those who support it (30%).
Civil society paying a heavy price
Already embattled by years of unsuccessful struggle for human rights – for starters, free and fair elections and the release of political prisoners – Belarusian civil society finds itself between a rock and a hard place. On one hand, protesting in Belarus remains extremely difficult and extremely dangerous, whether offline or online. On the other hand, activists who fled repression face significant challenges abroad, a situation made worse since February 2022 due to the enactment of sanctions.
An estimated 200,000 Belarusians had found refuge in Ukraine following the August 2020 crackdown. Fearing arrest in case Russians took over, many rights activists, journalists, and artists relocated again after February 2022. Most did not have a permanent residence permit in Ukraine, meaning that upon fleeing to EU countries, few were actually eligible for temporary protection. Whereas most neighbouring countries facilitated the issuing of humanitarian visas for Belarusians at risk, most other countries that introduced sanctions against Russia indiscriminately expanded visa bans to holders of Belarusian passports as well.
Hundreds of Belarusians have joined international battalions in Ukraine, and so are literally risking their lives in the defense of Ukraine. If taken prisoner by the Russian armed forces and returned to Belarus, they could face harsh punishment.
In diplomatic settings, the Belarusian democratic opposition in exile tirelessly advocates for decoupling civil population from the country’s leadership – widely recognised as illegitimate. It also argues that Belarus too could be considered a Russia-occupied territory. Without prejudice to the validity of such claims, it would be fair to remember that Belarusians are double hostages in this deadly conflict.
Anaïs Marin is an independent expert who also holds the (pro bono) mandate of UN Special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, since 2018
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
