The South Caucasus nation of Azerbaijan might decide to expand its small air force in the foreseeable future with affordable acquisitions from neighboring Turkey and Georgia.
Turkey and Azerbaijan have dramatically increased military ties in recent years. Turkish arms exports to Baku surged six-fold in the months leading up to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, in which Azerbaijan dealt Armenia a stinging defeat. Azerbaijan’s effective use of Turkish-built Bayraktar TB2 drones piqued interest in the drone from many countries.
Last June, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan joined his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev to visit the city of Shusha in Nagorno-Karabakh, which Azerbaijan captured in the war. They signed the eponymous Shusha Declaration on Allied Relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Turkey that pledged to increase the already extensive military cooperation between their two countries.
Baku might well seek more aircraft for its small air force that currently consists of a dozen Russian-built MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter jets and a dozen Su-25 Frogfoot attack aircraft.
It may seek additional aircraft, but not necessarily expensive high-performance jets. After all, Armenia spent huge sums modernizing its air force by buying four supermaneuverable Su-30SM multirole fighter jets from Russia that weren’t even used during the 2020 conflict, despite being the most advanced and capable fighter in Yerevan’s arsenal.
Instead, Azerbaijan could buy trainer aircraft that can also be used as light attack planes.
Turkey recently reached a deal to sell the African country of Niger a number of its locally built two-seat TAI Hürkuş turboprop trainers, its first export customer for the aircraft. It’s hopeful that Azerbaijan will buy the basic trainer next.
“We will see important developments [about exporting the aircraft to Azerbaijan],” Ismail Demir, head of Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries, said on Dec. 4.
The following day, a Hürkuş was taken for a test flight in Azerbaijan.
Aside from being a basic trainer, the Hürkuş can also carry general-purpose bombs and launch Turkish-built Smart Micro Munitions (MAM), the same armaments used on its Bayraktar drones.
In January, the Turkish government approved serial production of another domestically-built light combat/trainer aircraft, the TAI Hürjet. Unlike the Hürkuş, the Hürjet is an advanced jet trainer like South Korea’s T-50 Golden Eagle, an aircraft which won Seoul customers from Indonesia to Iraq.
Azerbaijan might also seek the Hürjet once it rolls off the production line to bolster its airpower, train new pilots and give its existing pilots additional flight time.
Azerbaijan has already shown an interest in augmenting its air force with such light jets. In February 2020, President Aliyev announced his country would buy advanced M-346 jet trainers from Italy that can also carry smart and general-purpose bombs along with missiles.
There have been rumors and speculation that Baku may seek the JF-17 Thunder from Pakistan, a close ally, as its next fighter jet rather than additional Russian fighters. The JF-17 is cheaper, and its new Block 3 variant comes equipped with active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar. The JF-17 Block 3, or eventually even Block 4, jets might eventually replace Azerbaijani MiG-29s in the next decade. In the meantime, some Hürjets could complement the Azerbaijani air force until it eventually procures more advanced 4.5-generation jets.
Azerbaijan also operates Su-25s. Turkey helped Baku modernize its Frogfoots to make them compatible with Turkish and locally-made armaments, reportedly including Turkey’s SOM cruise missile, which has a reported range of about 150 miles, which gives this close air support jet a standoff capability. The jets were also equipped with Belarusian Talisman electronic countermeasure pods that are credited with increasing their survivability in the last Nagorno-Karabakh war.
In September-October, Turkish social media was abuzz with rumors that Turkey had planned to buy 50 Su-25 built by the Republic of Georgia, home to Tbilisi Aircraft Industries that built Frogfoots during the Soviet era.
A Turkish TRHabur article dismissed these rumors. However, that report also cited an aviation researcher named Tolga Özbek, who speculated that Turkey might outfit new Georgian-built Su-25s with Turkish-built avionics and weapons for Azerbaijan. Baku previously bought many of its Su-25s from Georgia in 2002.
Georgia has ambitious plans to build a brand new Su-25 without any Russian components called the Ge-31 Bora. The fuselage and wings of the Bora will be built in Georgia. Aside from incorporating the Bora into its air force, Georgia hopes to export the jet. Georgia test flew Su-25s it modernized in March and April last year. Those upgraded Su-25s are “intended for both combat and training flights.”
As analysts have already noted, the Ge-31 “will only be possible if Georgia is able to attract significant investment from interested foreign partners.”
While Israel and Ukraine were cited as the most likely candidates, Azerbaijan could also prove suitable. It could finance the project and maybe even contract Tbilisi Aircraft Industries to build a Ge-31 variant to its specifications, hence an aircraft that could easily incorporate Turkish-built munitions and systems.
Such an arrangement could work out for everyone involved. After all, it would eventually provide Azerbaijan’s air force with a fleet of factory-fresh attack jets and Georgia the money it needs to make the Ge-31 a reality. Turkey’s arms industry would also welcome yet another lucrative contract for supplying its close Caucasian ally with weapons.
