Australia’s push to develop and deploy its own missiles lacks credibility as a means to deter conflict unless backed up by US support, a new paper warns.
The report, published by the Australian Army Research Centre, points to the Australian government’s desire to increase the country’s “self-reliance”.
But the paper argues Australian long-range strike capabilities have limited benefit as a tool to deter an aggressor, because they merely impose cost without changing the outcome of a conflict.
The paper examines “forward presence” – the concept of placing armed forces in locations outside a country’s main territory in support of national interests.
In the paper Dr Andrew Carr and Prof Stephan Frühling from the Australian National University note the forward presence of military forces to deter an adversary was “rare in Australian strategic history”, except for cold war-era commitments to try to stop the spread of communism in south-east Asia.
But the idea is increasingly embraced in Australian defence policy.
The defence minister, Richard Marles, has repeatedly argued the defence of Australia “doesn’t mean much without the security of our region and a settled global rules-based order”.
In April the government’s defence strategic review said the threat of direct invasion of Australia was “remote”, but the country “must contribute to the maintenance of a regional balance of power in the Indo-Pacific that is favourable to our interests”.
While many of the details are yet to be locked in, the review said the army should be “optimised for littoral operations in our northern land and maritime spaces and provide a long-range strike capability”.
The review supported the government’s decision to acquire Himars “and its associated missiles”, while also backing the co-development and rapid acquisition of Lockheed Martin’s Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), which has a range of up to 500km.
Carr and Frühling said the army’s envisaged forward presence would use “long-range land-based anti-air and anti-ship missile weapon systems that are yet to be acquired and will represent a new capability that will rely significantly on joint, external targeting networks”.
They agreed that land-based strike had a role to play, but took issue with the increasing tendency to link deterrence with Australian strike capabilities, saying this assumption “represents a rather narrow view”.
The authors cast doubt on “emerging ideas about a self-reliant deterrence framework focused on long-range strike”. They suggested Australian capabilities would have limited impact without support from the US and other partners.
“A ‘tripwire’ posture that merely imposes cost through strike, but does not change the outcome, suffers from the same credibility issues as any punishment-based threat,” they wrote.
“To execute it in the situation of deterrence failure would risk further escalation for no prospect of gain and throwing more forces into a lost cause – a concern that would be most acute for the side with the least ability to replenish small forces.”
The paper also looks at hypothetical scenarios, including sending Australian troops to Palawan, an island in the Philippines, to help the country withstand increasing political and military pressure from China.
But it warns that in this scenario Australia and the Philippines would need to be clear on their red lines to avoid “tension between the partners that could be exploited” by Beijing in the event of crisis.
“If the Chinese navy attacked a Philippines naval vessel in the South China Sea, would Australia be willing to use long-range missiles from Palawan to help?” the authors ask.
“If not, it may be better to eschew the forward deployment of such forces on a permanent basis and focus instead on capabilities that are more clearly aligned to the limits of Australia’s commitment to the defence of Philippine territory.”
They also said the army’s traditional role of taking and holding territory “remains crucial even as Australian defence policy enters an era of deterrence”.
The authors warned of “inherent tension” between political and operational requirements.
“For example, modern warfare places a premium on mobility and dispersion as key operational characteristics to ensure survivability,” they wrote.
“Deterrence and reassurance, however, may require the visibility of forces and confidence about their location to achieve their political objectives.”
The paper was launched by the chief of army, Lt Gen Simon Stuart, at ANU on Thursday evening. While aiming to spark debate, the paper does not reflect official policy.
