One of the more startling projections to arise from the latest population statistics is that even with an extra 5 million or so younger people, around one in 20 British residents (more than 3 million people) will be over the age of 85 by the year 2047.
The number of Britons reaching 100 years old – once a rare achievement – could stand at a quarter of a million by then, with the baby boomers still going strong (if not as strong as they were). Yet the news that Britain is getting older is not likely to dominate public discussion.
The talking point, somewhat predictably, centres instead on the fact that the total UK population is set to hit 72.5 million by 2032 thanks to net migration, compared with 56 million in 1982, 40 million in 1932, and 24 million in 1832.
Such dramatic expansion might suggest that Britain is getting more crowded, but also that it has always found ways to accommodate the masses – and to make sure it is never “full up”. The challenges (and the opportunities) for a medium-sized economy in need of a boost are plain.
A growing GDP can pay for better public services and add to military power, both of which would be very welcome in such troubled times. Entrepreneurial students from places such as India, Nigeria or China who choose to stay on – and are allowed to do so – might be the British answer to Steve Jobs or Mark Zuckerberg; wealth creators, rather than the criminal scroungers imagined in the more feverish corners of social media. Yet there is little sign that Britain’s leaders know how to get the balance right.
The vista for the UK in the medium term is of a grey nation suffering from terrible demographic trends: people will be living longer but in poorer health, which – in turn – will be placing unprecedented pressure on the dwindling number of people of working age, despite continuing inward migration. An extra 2 million or so pensioners are scheduled in for the early 2030s, all highly motivated to vote for whichever party protects their triple lock. It doesn’t feel sustainable.
It is a conundrum common to most Western countries – indeed, it is even more intractable in countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece. Due to the long tail of China’s “one child” policy, only recently abandoned, population trends in the world’s second-largest economy will be scarcely more encouraging. Given that climate change will exacerbate the movement of people to the developed economies, in part in response to labour shortages in these richer nations, the scope for economic strain and social tensions – in both directions – is obvious.
As politicians from all the main parties have discovered, immigration is something that touches people on an emotional as well as a rational level. The polling confirms a level of apprehension – and hostility – perhaps not witnessed before.
It is fair to say that in some areas, public services can be stretched. Recent net migration figures have been well above historical norms. Yet if the response is to restrict migration, both lawful and irregular – as many voters would wish – then the British will be faced with even more severe labour shortages, higher wage costs... and more inflation. The social care workers, nurses, doctors, engineers, building labourers and taxi drivers who keep Britain running and staff its public services won’t be there to alleviate matters and boost economic growth. Who, to put it at its simplest, will be looking after all those octogenarians?
Either way, debates about migration – already fractious in this age of the creep of the far right – will become even more fraught. Despite the proven British preference for cakeism, it is (in reality) not possible for a country simultaneously to age so rapidly and to prosper without a growing number of workers, ideally with the investment generated by a higher national income to boost their individual productivity.
Still, the latest results from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) are, as the experts stress, projections – not forecasts. They are contingent partly on domestic political decisions about migration, but on many more external factors, too – such the incidence of wars in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, the desertification of the Sahel, and the attitudes to migration of other governments. If America, for example, keeps refugees from Latin America out, then some may head to Europe instead.
But what should those domestic political decisions be? As we never stop hearing, the Labour government wants “growth, growth, growth”, but has given up the attempt to argue for the benefits of migration. It is even lukewarm about the harmless EU youth mobility plan, and is reluctant to grant the education visas that would stop many universities going bust. The Liberal Democrats and the SNP are more positive, but not vocal or explicit about numbers.
Nigel Farage airily declares that he favours “net zero” migration, which, given that he couldn’t control emigration from the UK, doesn’t even make sense. Kemi Badenoch is as unwilling to talk numbers as to defend the record on the Australian-style points system the last Conservative government brought in. She says that “our country” is not a dormitory or a hotel, but a home. She argues against multiculturalism and favours more integration, but won’t say how she would encourage this, or define the amorphous British values to which she’d require potential new citizens to adhere.
At any rate, the case for migration – economic, social, cultural – and the reality of Britain’s established, tolerant, multiracial society is being lost by default.
With Trumpian America setting the agenda, for many, diversity is no longer viewed as a strength. There’s been an unmistakeable uptick in racism, as the commentary around Holocaust Memorial Day sadly reminded us.
Despite claims to the contrary, no one favours an “open door” policy – and most people accept that some migration is both desirable and inevitable. Behind that, there are no policies – only some dramatic-looking ONS figures. This state of affairs is not sufficient to bring stability, let alone settle the arguments.
