MUMBAI — In the year since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Western democracies have condemned Moscow, slapped wide-ranging sanctions on it, cut back on Russian oil and gas and sent unprecedented amounts of arms and ammunition to help Ukraine defend itself.
But the world's biggest democracy — India — hasn't done any of that.
India has solidified ties with Moscow. Prime Minister Narendra Modi met with Vladimir Putin in September and called their countries' friendship "unbreakable." He did tell the Russian president it's "not a time for war." But a year on, Modi still refuses to assign blame for the violence, and has voiced more concern over the spike in global food and fuel prices triggered by the war.
Meanwhile, as Europe eschews Russian oil and gas, India has doubled down on buying Russian oil at bargain prices — much to Washington's chagrin. And India continues to place orders for Russian-made weapons.
All this is a reminder that, a year into this war, condemnation of Russia is far from unanimous. Much of the global south actually sees the West's focus on Ukraine as a distraction from other, more pressing issues like food security, inflation and mounting debt.
Analysts and political scientists cite four main factors shaping India's policy toward Ukraine and Russia: History, energy, arms and influence.
Factor #1: The India-Russia relationship goes way back
India was still under British colonial rule when Russia opened its first consulate there in 1900, in Mumbai. But relations really took off during the Cold War.
"It started out as strategic sympathy for the Soviet Union, in the backdrop of India getting independence from the British. So it's an anti-colonial experience, anti-imperialism," says Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan, a political scientist at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. "And as the Cold War picked up, it became a more anti-West, anti-U.S. sentiment they shared."
The end of the Cold War didn't change that. Neither has the Ukraine war. India's nationalist TV news channels often accuse the United States — rather than Russia — of doing more to ruin Ukraine.
In November, Modi's top diplomat, S. Jaishankar, traveled to Moscow, where he stood alongside his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov and called their countries' relationship "steady and time-tested."
Modi has called for a cease-fire in Ukraine, without condemning Russia's attacks. Some of his political opponents say that doesn't go far enough, and point toward India's actions rather than its words.
"The actions that India is engaged in so far do not reflect any remorse or even mild criticism of the events in Ukraine," says Praveen Chakravarty, a political economist affiliated with the opposition Indian National Congress party. "If anything, it seems to aid and abet."
Factor #2: India wants cheap Russian oil
India has one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. (The IMF forecasts 6.8% growth for India this year, compared to just 1.6% for the United States.) By 2030, India is forecast to be the third-largest economy in the world, behind the U.S. and China.
It's already the third-largest oil consumer in the world. And it needs even more to fuel all that growth. But because India has few oil and gas reserves of its own, most of the oil it needs has to be imported. It's also a relatively poor country, particularly sensitive to price.
That's where Russia comes in.
India still buys more oil from Middle Eastern countries than Russia. But its Russian share has skyrocketed. In December, India imported 1.2 million barrels of Russian crude. That's a whopping 33 times more than a year earlier. In January, the share of Russian crude rose to 28% of India's oil imports — up from just 0.2% before Moscow's invasion of Ukraine.
Indian officials have defended those purchases by saying it's their job to find bargains for their citizens. And Jaishankar, the foreign minister, has suggested it's hypocritical of wealthier Westerners to ask them not to.
"Europe has managed to reduce its imports [of Russian gas] while doing it in a manner that is comfortable," Jaishankar told an Austrian TV channel last month. "At 60,000 euros or whatever is your per capita income, you're so caring about your population. I have a population at 2,000 dollars [per capita annual income]. I also need energy, and I am not in a position to pay high prices for oil."
Last April, Jaishankar visited the White House for a virtual summit between Modi and President Biden. There, U.S. officials told their Indian counterparts they understand India's energy needs and were hoping only that India would not "accelerate" Russian oil purchases.
India basically ignored that. But the Biden administration now says it's actually fine with that.
Earlier this month, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources Geoffery Pyatt said Washington is "comfortable" with India's approach on Russian oil. And Karen Donfried, the assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs, said the U.S. is not looking at sanctioning India for this.
Here's one possible explanation for Washington's change of heart: India is buying Russian crude at deep discounts — something the West can't do because of sanctions, or doesn't want to do because of the optics. Then India refines that same Russian oil and exports it onward to the U.S. and Europe. So the West gets Russian oil, without getting its hands dirty.
"U.S. treasury officials have two main goals: keep the market well supplied and deprive Russia of oil revenue," Ben Cahill, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, recently told Bloomberg. "They are aware that Indian and Chinese refiners can earn bigger margins by buying discounted Russian crude and exporting products at market prices. They're fine with that."
Factor #3: Moscow is India's biggest arms dealer
India's military has historically been equipped with Russian and Soviet weapons. Most of those contracts date back to the Cold War, a conflict in which India was officially non-aligned but close to Moscow. So most of India's arsenal was — and still is — Soviet-made.
By now, some those 30-something-year-old weapons are deteriorating.
"Let's just go to the [Indian] Air Force. Most of those Sukhois and MiGs [fighter aircraft] are referred to as 'flying coffins.' Very often Indian pilots die when they are testing, or flying, those," says Aparna Pande, a political scientist at the Hudson Institute in Washington. "So India knows they need to be replaced."
Indian defense experts may have been the only ones not surprised to see Russian tanks falling apart in Ukraine this past year, Pande says. They've been unhappy with Russian equipment for years.
So the Indian government has started replacing some of its Soviet-made aircraft and artillery with French, Israeli and American versions. But it's a time-consuming and costly task to update India's entire arsenal, Pande notes.
"Let's say my entire apartment had only IKEA furniture, and now I decide, 'OK now I want to change it, and I want West Elm.' I cannot just replace one chair. I have to change my entire dining table and all the chairs," Pande explains. "So what India has done [in terms of updating its weapons] is piecemeal. But those big ticket items are still Russian-made. So that's the change which has to happen, and this is what will reduce the Russian influence."
Despite the Indian government's efforts to diversify, Moscow continues to be India's biggest arms dealer — more than 30 years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Russia has reportedly supplied India with around $13 billion in weapons in the past five years alone.
There's one big reason India needs all these weapons: China.
Factor #4: India wants to prevent Putin from getting closer to China's Xi Jinping
India's biggest foreign policy preoccupation is not Ukraine or Russia. It's China. The two countries share a more than 2,000-mile disputed border. Satellite imagery shows China may be encroaching on Indian territory. Soldiers clashed there in June 2020, and again this past December.
And as the West isolates Russia, India fears Putin is already looking eastward, toward Beijing.
"You're already seeing a very close Russia-China relationship emerging, even in the last few years," says the ORF's Rajagopalan. "So the current Indian approach is, we don't want Russia to go completely into the Chinese fold. Because for India, China has become the No. 1 national security threat."
Despite the Ukraine war, that's true for Washington too.
So even if Washington doesn't like it, Biden administration officials say they understand why India has not condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and they're willing to grant India a wide berth.
They may even see India's continued ties with Putin as useful — to try to mitigate just how far the Ukraine war drives him into Xi Jinping's arms.
