But when a country has only one day’s stock of petrol and not enough dollars to pay for the three ships carrying crude and furnace oil anchored off the coast, selling anything that isn’t nailed down starts to look like a worthy strategy. The problem is Sri Lanka has already given away some of its most strategic points to China, which until recently was working hard to expand its footprint there. Now, Beijing has offered loans of “a few hundred million dollars," Wickremesinghe told the Financial Times, while his government seeks to renegotiate about $3.5 billion of existing debts to China.
Wickremesinghe is pushing to fast-track talks with the International Monetary Fund, but his negotiators haven’t yet reached a staff-level agreement with the multilateral lender. And until the loans start flowing, Sri Lanka is living day-to-day. Protestors have established a permanent presence in the capital, Colombo, and continue to demand the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. “Give us back our stolen money," one sign reads, as popular fury at economic hardships shows no sign of subsiding.
China is Sri Lanka’s single largest bilateral creditor, and its white elephants—the Chinese-built Hambantota port and little-used airport near the ancestral village of the Rajapaksa family—have contributed to rage against the political dynasty that includes the president and his brother Mahinda, who on 9 May resigned as prime minister after violence that left nine people dead and dozens wounded. The protests had followed months of growing civil unrest over their disastrous fertilizer ban that has led to ongoing food shortages and a failure to handle the foreign-currency crisis.
There’s also Colombo Port City, which was meant to position the capital as the next big Asian financial centre. But its status as a special economic zone means the government sees little benefit for the scar that’s been created along the waterfront. It, like the port, is controlled by a Chinese-owned company, with a significant portion of it on a 99-year lease.
Of course, not only Beijing seeks to exert influence in Sri Lanka. India’s slice may be smaller but it holds significant sway simply via its political and economic sway in the region. New Delhi has provided more than $3.5 billion in assistance this year to help pay for fuel, food and medicine. The arrival of Indian shipments of diesel and petrol these past two weeks have caused chaos in Colombo as citizens flocked to fuel stations to try and fill their vehicles. Last September, India’s Adani Group entered a $700 million deal to develop a deep-water container terminal in Sri Lanka in what the Sydney-based Lowy Institute described as a “strategic game-changer" in the battle for influence between Beijing and New Delhi. It will sit next to the Chinese-run terminal at Colombo Port . Then in January, Indian Oil subsidiary Lanka IOC took a 49% stake in the joint development of the Trincomalee oil tank farm, with Ceylon Petroleum keeping a 51% stake in the finalization of a deal that was struck in 1987. Sri Lanka’s location along one of the world’s busiest shipping routes means it’s crucial for maintaining global supply chains.
So what else can the country privatize? It worries political economists like Ahilan Kadirgamar, who is concerned about the social impact of key assets leaving government hands. Kadirgamar of the University of Jaffna said officials were most likely to consider Ceylon Electricity Board and Ceylon Petroleum Corp. He predicts there will be significant resistance to such a move. “Few developing countries have the kind of electricity connectivity and services as Sri Lanka does. Even day-wage labouring families have access to electricity, which benefits their children’s education." The IMF will be pressing Colombo to reduce the agency’s losses, he predicts, and the government may be tempted to fill its coffers via a sale rather than reforming the sector.
For now, the country appears to have no other option but to rely on India and China’s largesse. The World Bank said that until Colombo puts in place an “adequate macroeconomic policy framework" that restores stability and growth, it does not intend to offer new financing.
Ruth Pollard is a Bloomberg Opinion editor
