Some members of Australia's elite special forces allegedly committed war crimes in Afghanistan amid a "complete lack of accountability" from the military chain of command, a confidential defence inquiry has found.
The report reveals that special forces insiders have confidentially disclosed "unsanctioned and illegal application of violence on operations" by Australian special forces soldiers which extend to a "disregard for human life and dignity".
The inquiry was commissioned in 2016 by then Special Operations Commander Major General Jeff Sengelman, and was backed by incoming defence force chief Angus Campbell.
The report which has been seen by Fairfax Media also describes "enormous and difficult challenges" facing the Australian government to confront conduct that goes "well beyond blowing off steam" and involves "problems deeply embedded in the culture" of the elite taskforce at the spearhead of Australia's mission in Afghanistan.
Defence Minister Marise Payne has been briefed on the report's contents.
The confidential inquiry also warns that Australia's national security is being damaged by "major gaps in knowledge" across government about the capability and culture of Special Operations Command, and poor coordination between its two key units, the Special Air Service Regiment and the Commandos.
Apart from overseas deployments, special forces are also available for domestic counter-terrorism response when called out by state and territory police forces.
The inquiry was conducted by defence department consultant Dr Samantha Crompvoets.
It gives the clearest indication yet of the biggest scandal to face the Australian military in years.
Allegations of war crimes are the subject of an investigation by NSW judge Paul Brereton into the activities of Australia's special forces in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2016. The Brereton investigation was prompted by the Crompvoets report.
Previous efforts to obtain the Crompvoets report under FOI laws have been blocked.
In a statement, the defence force said it took "all allegations about Australian Forces seriously" and that the Brereton inquiry, under the auspices of the Inspector General of the ADF, would make "recommendations" about how to deal with any substantiated allegations of war crimes.
"The IGADF Afghanistan Inquiry has, for some time, been aware of allegations of significant issues involving the Special Operations Task Group in Afghanistan, which are within the scope of the Inquiry," the statement said.
Those interviewed by the Crompvoets inquiry include defence top brass, "influential" officials from the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, federal police officers, public servants from the department of foreign affairs and spy agency ASIO and others "at ministerial level."
But Dr Crompvoets wrote that it was defence and special forces "insiders" who provided the "more troubling" instances of dysfunction, concealment and command failure.
The testimony of insiders
"They described an organisation rift [sic] by internal tensions and rivalry (especially between SASR and commando units), a pattern of elitist/condescending behaviours towards support personnel, perceptions of senior leadership failure and cover-ups - real or imagined, and misdemeanours or more serious offences in the field, as well as a culture of drug and alcohol abuse," the report says.
"There is no doubt that there are major issues of morale and performance involved - at the least."
The Crompvoets inquiry acknowledges the impressive capability of the special forces to conduct sensitive and dangerous operations, but contrasts the image of the special forces portrayed to the Australian public with a darker, internal perspective that includes "unverifiable accounts of extremely serious breaches of accountability and trust" on overseas operations and within Australia.
"Some of these related to policy, process and governance failure - like loss of weapons, unacceptable WHS [Workplace Health and Safety] practices, poor audit results, injudicious and wasteful practices in resources management, less than transparent or compliant acquisition practices," the report says.
"Even more concerning were allusions to behaviour and practices involving abuse of drugs and alcohol, domestic violence, unsanctioned and illegal application of violence on operations and the perception of a complete lack of accountability at times."
'Horrendous things'
The report removes the name of special forces interviewees - several of whom provided candid accounts on condition of confidentiality - but includes excerpts of their testimony.
An interviewee described as an "SOF [special operations forces] insider" told Dr Crompvoets that "I know there were over the last 15 years some horrendous things. Some just disgraceful things happened in Kabul ... very bad news, or just inappropriate behaviour, but it was pretty much kept under wraps."
Another "SOF insider" told Dr Crompvoets of a cover-up culture dedicated to "protecting people".
Dr Crompvoets said "others felt there was a deep impediment to change because of the extent to which leaders with SOF backgrounds, highly placed through the SOF and beyond, were compromised by their own participation or complicity in problematic behaviours of the past."
A senior government official told Dr Crompvoets that former special forces "leaders have told me to 'watch [current leaders]' ... it's alarming that's their view. You think 'what the hell is going on in there?'".
The report found the "significant consequence" of the dysfunctional relationship between the east coast-based Commandos and Perth-based SASR "seems to be erosion in, and sub optimal delivery of SOF capability outcomes to Defence and ultimately Government".
One person interviewed disclosed that despite working with the Commandos and the SASR, "ridiculously, I am not allowed to tell the West [SAS] about what we are doing here and the West don't want the East [Commandos] to know what they are doing. Anyone can clearly see, if they collaborated, there would be huge capability gains and efficiencies." Another informant who was debriefed by Dr Crompvoets described the undermining of training exercises, including the joint US-Australian Talisman Saber event.
"The serious internal cultural problems revealed in this report present major challenges for SOCOMD [Special Operations Command] and will resist simple or cosmetic solutions," the report concludes.
"The problems, of themselves, are beyond the scope of this study, but they have a clear impact on risk and reputation that is directly relevant to the way that SOCOMD works with and is viewed by partner agencies (as well as more broadly for national security and/or strategic/political interests)."
"The current situation holds inherent risks, not only for sub-optimal delivery of capacity, but potentially for national security and/or strategic/political interests, given the sensitive nature of deployments."
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